Cognitive Representations in the Sensory and Memory Systems of the Human Brain : Evidence from Brain Damage and MEG by Valtonen, Jussi
 Cognitive Representations in the  
Sensory and Memory Systems of the Human Brain:   
Evidence from Brain Damage and MEG 
 
Jussi Valtonen 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Behavioural Sciences 
University of Helsinki, Finland 
 
Department of Cognitive Science 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA 
 
 
Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, 
by due permission of the Faculty of Behavioural Sciences  
at the University of Helsinki 
in Auditorium XII of the University Main Building, Unioninkatu 34,  
on the 16th of May, 2016, at 12 o’clock 
 
University of Helsinki  
Institute of Behavioural Sciences 
 Studies in Psychology 117: 2016 
Supervisors 
Professor Michael McCloskey, PhD, Department of Cognitive Science, Johns Hopkins 
University, Baltimore, MD, USA 
Adjunct Professor Hannu Tiitinen, PhD, Department of Engineering and Computational 
Science, Aalto University, Espoo, Finland 
Professor Elisabet Service, PhD, Department of Linguistics and Languages, McMaster 
University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 
Professor Kimmo Alho, PhD, Institute of Behavioural Sciences, University of Helsinki, 
Finland 
Reviewers 
Professor Jane Riddoch, PhD, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of 
Oxford, Oxford, UK 
Professor Matti Laine, PhD, Department of Psychology and Logopedics, Åbo Akademi, 
Turku, Finland 
Opponent 
Professor E. Charles Leek, PhD, School of Psychology, Bangor University, Bangor, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN-L 1798-842X 
ISSN 1798-842X 
ISBN 978-951-51-2161-5 (pbk.)  
ISBN 978-951-51-2162-2 (PDF)  
http://www.ethesis.helsinki.fi  
Unigrafia Oy 
Helsinki 2016
  3 
Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................... 5?
Tiivistelmä .................................................................................................. 7?
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... 9?
List of original publications ...................................................................... 11?
Abbreviations ........................................................................................... 12?
1.? Introduction: Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience ............................... 14?
1.1.? Methods in cognitive neuroscience and levels of analysis ................................ 15?
1.1.1.? Experimental studies of patients with cognitive deficits ...................... 16?
1.1.2.? Electrophysiological methods and functional neuroimaging .............. 19?
1.2.? Cognitive representations and multiple methods ........................................... 22?
2.? Part One: Representation of Object Orientation .................................. 23?
2.1.? Orientation processing in the primate visual system ...................................... 24?
2.1.1.? Behavioral evidence for orientation processing .................................. 25?
2.1.2.? Summary .............................................................................................. 30?
2.2.? Aims of Part One ............................................................................................... 31?
2.3.? Methods ............................................................................................................. 31?
2.3.1.? Participants ........................................................................................... 31?
2.3.2.? Case report ............................................................................................ 31?
2.4.? Experimental tasks .......................................................................................... 34?
2.4.1.? Experiment 1: Same-different judgments of arrow orientation ......... 34?
2.4.2.? Experiment 2: Visual reproduction of line orientation ...................... 36?
2.4.3.? Experiment 3: Tactile reproduction of line orientation ...................... 41?
2.4.4.? Experiment 4: Lines with differentiated ends .................................... 44?
2.4.5.? Discussion ............................................................................................ 48?
2.5.? Representation of orientation: The COR hypothesis ...................................... 49?
2.5.1.? The representation of orientation and spatial location ....................... 51?
2.5.2.? The coordinate-system orientation representation hypothesis ......... 52?
2.5.3.? Orientation errors and the COR hypothesis ....................................... 56?
2.6.? General discussion ........................................................................................... 60?
3.? Part Two: The Neural Basis for the Acquisition of New Memory 
Representations ................................................................................... 65?
3.1.? The medial temporal lobe, the hippocampus and human memory ................ 66?
3.2.? Memory function supported by non-MTL-structures .................................... 68?
3.3.? Aims of Part Two .............................................................................................. 70?
  4
3.4.? Study III ............................................................................................................ 71?
3.4.1.? Can non-hippocampal structures support complex learning? ............ 71?
3.4.2.? Methods ............................................................................................... 74?
3.4.3.? Results ................................................................................................. 79?
3.4.4.? Discussion ............................................................................................ 83?
3.5.? Study IV ............................................................................................................ 85?
3.5.1.? Does new memory acquisition affect sensory cortical processing? .... 85?
3.5.2.? Methods ............................................................................................... 92?
3.5.3.? Results ................................................................................................. 94?
3.5.4.? Discussion ............................................................................................ 97?
3.6.? The Neural Basis for the Acquisition of Memory Representations .............. 102?
4.? General Discussion: Levels of Analysis, Converging Evidence and 
Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience ................................................... 104?
4.1.? Levels of analysis and the investigation of cognitive deficits ........................ 104?
4.1.1.? Advantages of the single-patient method for studies of cognition ... 105?
4.1.2.? Cognitive theories as a guide for functional neuroimaging .............. 106?
4.1.3.? Brain-damaged patients and theories of brain function .................... 107?
4.1.4.? Limitations of the single-patient approach ........................................ 110?
4.2.? Converging evidence from neuroimaging and studies of brain damage ....... 112?
4.3.? Levels of analysis and evidence from MEG .................................................... 114?
4.3.1.? Goals of brain measures and Study IV ............................................... 114?
4.3.2.? Advantages of MEG ............................................................................ 117?
4.4.? Further methodological observations ............................................................ 118?
4.4.1.? Universality, individual variability and cognitive neuroscience ........ 118?
4.4.2.? Task analysis and cognitive processes .............................................. 120?
5.? References ......................................................................................... 122?
 
  5
Abstract 
Cognitive representations are constructed internally of events and objects in the 
outside world. The exact nature of these representations, however, is not fully 
understood. Studies of cognitive deficits, electromagnetic recordings of brain 
activity and functional neuroimaging provide complementary means for 
investigating these representations and their neural basis at multiple levels of 
analysis. This thesis combined experimental data collected using multiple 
methods to study cognitive representations and their neural basis in visual 
information processing and memory. The aim of the thesis was both to collect 
new empirical evidence to inform current theories of vision and memory, and to 
use these studies to discuss methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience. 
The thesis consists of four empirical studies. Studies I-II investigated how 
spatial information about the orientation of objects is represented in the visual 
system. Study I was conducted with an individual with a cognitive impairment 
in visual processing, patient BC. Experimental results from BC showed that 
spatial orientation is represented compositionally in the visual system, such that 
the direction of a line orientation’s tilt from a vertical mental reference meridian 
is coded independently of the magnitude of angular displacement. Further, the 
cognitive locus of impairment suggested that these representations are 
maintained at a supra-modal level. Based on experimental evidence from BC 
and other patients with cognitive deficits in spatial processing, a theoretical 
framework, the co-ordinate system hypothesis of orientation representation 
(COR), was proposed in Study II for interpreting orientation errors. 
Studies III-IV investigated the neural basis for the acquisition of new 
memory representations in the brain. The medial temporal lobe (MTL) is known 
to be crucial for declarative memory, but how other brain areas outside the MTL 
interact to support the construction of new memory representations is not fully 
understood. Study III investigated new memory acquisition in an amnesic 
individual, LSJ, who has suffered extensive bilateral MTL damage, including the 
near-complete destruction of the hippocampus. The results showed that non-
hippocampal structures can support acquisition of new long-term memory 
representations in a context cognitively more complex than has previously been 
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demonstrated. Study IV investigated memory acquisition in neurologically 
healthy adults using whole-head magnetoencephalography (MEG). The results 
showed that during the acquisition of declarative-memory representations, the 
feature analysis systems in different sensory modalities interact at a level as 
early as that of the sensory cortices. Together, the results of Studies III and IV 
demonstrate that several different non-hippocampal and non-MTL structures 
interact with the MTL/hippocampal memory system at multiple processing 
levels to support acquisition of memory representations in the intact human 
brain. Methodological questions about converging evidence and multiple levels 
of analysis in cognitive neuroscience are discussed in light of the four empirical 
studies.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Aivoissa muodostetaan kognitiivisia edustumia ulkomaailmasta. Näiden 
edustumien luonnetta ei kuitenkaan täysin tunneta. Näitä edustumia ja niiden 
hermostollista perustaa voidaan tutkia toisiaan täydentävillä keinoilla, joihin 
kuuluvat kognitiivisista häiriöistä kärsivien yksilöiden kokeelliset tutkimukset, 
aivojen toiminnan elektromagneettiset mittaukset ja toiminnalliset 
aivokuvantamismenetelmät. Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkittiin kognitiivisia 
edustumia ja niiden hermostollista perustaa aivojen näkö- ja 
muistijärjestelmissä kokeellisen aineiston avulla, joka hankittiin toisiaan 
täydentävillä menetelmillä. Väitöskirjan tavoitteena oli sekä hankkia uutta 
empiiristä tietoa näköjärjestelmästä ja muistista että käyttää osatutkimuksia 
kontekstina metodologisten kysymysten pohtimiseen kognitiivisessa 
neurotieteessä. 
Väitöskirja koostuu neljästä osatutkimuksesta. Osatutkimuksissa I-II 
selvitettiin, miten avaruudellinen tieto esineiden orientaatiosta on edustettuna 
näköjärjestelmässä. Koehenkilönä osatutkimuksessa I oli potilas BC, joka kärsii 
näköinformaation käsittelyyn vaikuttavasta kognitiivisesta häiriöstä. Kokeelliset 
tulokset potilas BC:ltä osoittivat, että avaruudellinen orientaatio on 
näköjärjestelmässä edustettuna kompositionaalisesti siten, että 
viivaorientaation kallistussuunta pystysuorasta mielensisäisestä meridiaanista 
on edustettu kallistuskulmasta riippumatta. Häiriön kognitiivinen locus viittasi 
siihen, että edustumat ovat supramodaalisia eli useita aistipiirejä kattavia. 
Osatutkimuksessa II potilas BC:n ja muiden kognitiivisista häiriöistä kärsivien 
potilaiden koetulosten perusteella laadittiin teoreettinen viitekehys, 
orientaatioedustumien koordinaatistohypoteesi COR, jonka avulla 
orientaatiovirheitä voidaan tulkita. 
Osatutkimuksissa III-IV selvitettiin hermostollisia mekanismeja, joiden 
varassa uusia muistiedustumia muodostetaan. Mediaalinen temporaalilohko 
(MTL) tiedetään deklaratiiviselle muistille ratkaisevan tärkeäksi, mutta MTL:n 
ja muiden aivoalueiden välistä yhteistyötä uusia muistiedustumia 
muodostettaessa ei täysin tunneta. Osatutkimuksessa III uusien 
muistiedustumien muodostumista tutkittiin vakavasta muistihäiriöstä 
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kärsivällä potilaalla LSJ:llä, jolla on laajoja MTL-alueen molemminpuolisia 
vaurioita ja jonka hippokampus on lähes täydellisesti tuhoutunut. Tulokset 
osoittivat, että uusien pitkäkestoisten muistiedustumien muodostuminen on 
mahdollista ei-hippokampaalisten rakenteiden varassa kognitiivisesti 
monimutkaisemmissa tehtäväympäristöissä kuin aiemmin on osoitettu. 
Osatutkimuksessa IV muistiedustumien muodostumista tutkittiin 
neurologisesti terveillä koehenkilöillä käyttämällä magnetoenkefalografiaa 
(MEG:tä). Tulokset osoittivat, että deklaratiivisia muistiedustumia 
muodostettaessa eri aistimodaliteettien piirreanalyysijärjestelmät vaikuttavat 
toisiinsa niinkin varhain kuin sensoristen aivokuorenalueiden tasolla. 
Kokonaisuutena osatutkimusten III-IV tulokset osoittavat, että ei-
hippokampaaliset ja MTL:n ulkopuoliset järjestelmät aivoissa tekevät 
hippokampuksen ja MTL-alueiden kanssa yhteistyötä useilla eri 
prosessointitasoilla, kun uusia muistiedustumia muodostetaan.  
Kognitiivisen neurotieteen metodologisia kysymyksiä pohditaan väitöskirjan 
neljän empiirisen osatutkimuksen valossa eri selitystasojen ja toisiaan 
täydentävien tutkimustulosten näkökulmista.  
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1. Introduction: Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience 
Cognitive neuroscience aims to understand how the brain enables the mind, to 
use the words of Gazzaniga and colleagues (2002). For investigating this 
question, 21st-century cognitive neuroscientists have a vast array of methods at 
their disposal. In addition to behavioral experiments that can be employed to 
study, for instance, how objects and events are represented at the cognitive 
level, electrophysiological tools and functional neuroimaging techniques can be 
used to record brain activity or its metabolic correlates during cognitive tasks to 
shed light on the underlying neural processes (for a review of cutting-edge 
methods, see Gazzaniga & Mangun, 2014). Further, all these methods can be 
used both in neurologically intact participants and in individuals with acquired 
or developmental cognitive deficits. Thus, the available range of methods 
provides an opportunity to study human cognition and brain function from 
more diverse perspectives than ever before.  
All methods are not equally suited for all purposes, however; depending on 
the question the researcher seeks to address, a given approach can be more 
informative than others. The relative merits of different methodologies can be a 
matter of intense disagreement: For example, the contribution of functional 
neuroimaging to cognitive theories has been under heated debate during the 
past decade (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Caplan & Chen, 2006; Coltheart, 
2006a; 2006b; 2010b; Henson, 2005; Jonides, Nee, & Berman, 2006; 
Loosemore & Harley, 2010; Love, 2015; Mole & Klein, 2010; Page, 2006; 
Umiltà, 2006; Wixted & Mickes, 2013). Similarly, different authors have 
disagreed on the relative importance and methods of studying cognitive 
impairments for understanding cognition and brain function (Caramazza & 
McCloskey, 1988; Caramazza, 1992; Coltheart, 2010a; Frith, 1998; Kosslyn & 
Intriligator, 1992; McCloskey, 2001; Patterson & Plaut, 2009). That is, no 
consensus exists whether the question of how the brain enables the mind should 
be approached primarily or first from the side of the mind or the brain, or which 
methods should be preferred for different purposes. 
In addition to reflecting the complexity inherent in trying to understand how 
the mind/brain works, these disagreements about methodology highlight the 
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importance of two things. First, it is essential to understand the assets and 
limitations of the methodology one uses: being able to select the optimal 
methodology according to the research question at hand requires an 
understanding of the rationale and relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each approach. Second, the debates underscore the value of diverse methods. 
An uncontroversial view is that converging evidence from multiple methods 
provides a stronger basis for conclusions than results from any single method 
alone (e.g., Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Chatterjee, 2005; D'Esposito, 2010; 
Humphreys & Price, 2001; Ochsner & Kosslyn, 2014; Rapp, 2011; Wager & 
Lindquist, 2011). 
In this doctoral dissertation, different methodologies were used in four 
empirical studies to investigate questions concerning the cognitive neuroscience 
of visual information processing and memory. The aim of this thesis was both to 
acquire new experimental evidence about cognitive representations and their 
neural basis in the intact mind/brain, and also to use these empirical studies to 
discuss advantages and limitations of different methodological approaches for 
understanding cognition and brain function.  
1.1. Methods in cognitive neuroscience and levels of analysis 
Marr (1982) proposed that three levels of analysis are required for 
understanding any complex computational system. According to Marr’s 
influential tripartite view, these are the computational level, i.e., what problems 
the system is trying to solve and why (sometimes referred to as task analysis); 
the algorithmic and representational level, i.e., the representations and 
processes the system uses to accomplish these goals; and the implementation 
level, i.e., how these representations and processes are physically instantiated in 
the brain.  
Ultimately, cognitive neuroscience aims to achieve an understanding of the 
mind/brain that will encompass multiple levels such as the ones proposed by 
Marr (Ochsner & Kosslyn, 2014). Theories about cognitive processes, such as 
those formulated in cognitive psychology, can be taken to correspond most 
directly to the algorithmic and representational level (although the levels are 
not completely independent, see Marr, 1982). In contrast, questions about how 
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these processes are instantiated in the brain (mostly) relate to the 
implementation level. Studies of cognitive deficits and electromagnetic and 
hemodynamic neuroimaging techniques provide means for approaching 
multiple levels of analysis in complementary ways.  
1.1.1. Experimental studies of patients with cognitive deficits 
Since Broca’s (1861) investigations of his patient Tan, studies of brain-damaged 
patients have established the foundation for modern cognitive neuroscience (for 
a historical perspective, see Selnes, 2001). Early studies of cognitive deficits not 
only provided evidence that cognitive abilities such as language are not unitary 
functions (Caramazza & Coltheart, 2006), but in setting up a potential link 
between specific cognitive deficits and particular locations of brain injuries, also 
laid the foundational ground for modern neuroimaging methods aiming to 
localize cognitive functions (D'Esposito, 2010; Rorden & Karnath, 2004). 
Scientifically perhaps the most influential neuropsychological patient of all time 
is HM, whose case continued to provide new experimental evidence about the 
cognitive and neural organization of human memory for more than 50 years 
until his death. HM was studied in his lifetime by nearly 100 investigators, and 
Scoville and Milner’s (1957) seminal paper documenting his amnesia has been 
cited almost 2000 times (Corkin, 2002). 
The rationale for studying brain-damaged individuals to understand normal 
cognition and brain function is based on several assumptions, three of which 
can be considered most essential (Caramazza, 1986; 1992; Coltheart, 2001; 
Martin & Hull, 2007; McCloskey & Caramazza, 1988; Shallice, 1988). First, the 
human cognitive system is assumed to be complex and to consist of a number of 
information-processing components that are functionally (at least relatively) 
distinct. Second, it is assumed that brain damage can cause impairments in this 
system without bringing about a qualitatively different organization of function 
or the formation of entirely new subcomponents. Third, the approach is 
motivated by the assumption of universality (Caramazza, 1986; Caramazza & 
McCloskey, 1988), one of the cornerstones of cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience (Rapp, 2011). This is the assumption that the functional 
architecture of the cognitive system is qualitatively invariant across 
neurologically intact individuals. (For more detailed discussions of 
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assumptions, see Caramazza & McCloskey, 1988; Caramazza, 1992; Coltheart, 
2001; McCloskey & Caramazza, 1988; McCloskey, 2001; 2003; Shallice, 1988; 
and for discussions of concerns relating to the limitations and rationale of 
neuropsychological patient studies see Kosslyn & Intriligator, 1992; Patterson & 
Plaut, 2009). 
Importantly, the universality assumption does not mean that there are no 
individual differences; it is clear that there are. However, the cognitive 
(neuro)scientist is generally interested in the principles of cognition and brain 
function that are universal to all humans. Practically all studies of brain and 
cognition regardless of methodology assume that the general cognitive 
architecture and the underlying principles of brain organization are essentially 
the same for all humans, and that these universal principles are the subject of 
investigation in cognitive neuroscience.  
Based on the universality assumption, differences in performance among 
participants in a standard cognitive psychology experiment are not taken to 
result from fundamentally different cognitive architectures in different 
individuals, but from random and/or irrelevant sources such as imperfect 
measurement tools (McCloskey & Caramazza, 1988). Because of this 
assumption, individual variation among healthy participants in experimental 
data is treated as noise, and data can be collapsed across subjects to improve the 
signal-to-noise ratio. Thus, the universality assumption provides one of the 
methodological foundations for making inferences about experimental data 
from healthy subjects in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.1 
Because the cognitive architecture is assumed to be universal, cognitive 
theories make predictions not only about the cognitive performance of intact 
humans, but also about the kinds of cognitive impairment that are possible. 
Thus, cognitive impairments constitute tests for theories of normal cognition, 
and can be used to inform these theories. If the assumption of universality is 
correct, then patients with brain damage can be assumed to have had the same 
                                                
1 It is not clear, however, how potentially non-trivial individual differences should be taken 
into consideration. This issue will be discussed in section 4, General Discussion. 
  18
cognitive system prior to the damage2, and the researcher can try to make 
inferences about this system based on experimental data from the brain-
damaged individual.  
One type of inference about normal cognition from cognitive deficits is based 
on single and double dissociations (Frith, 1998; Shallice, 1988). However, this is 
only one possible form of evidence in patterns of impaired performance; neither 
the types of data nor the kinds of inferences are restricted a priori. (For a 
detailed discussion, see McCloskey, 2003.) 
Patients with cognitive deficits are studied both in groups and as single cases. 
However, because of complications relating to assumptions of group 
homogeneity, which arguably cannot be ensured a priori in cases of cognitive 
impairment, several authors consider the single-case approach more reliable 
than aggregating data across subjects (Caramazza, 1986; 1992; Caramazza & 
McCloskey, 1988; Caramazza & Badecker, 1991; Ellis, 1987; McCloskey & 
Caramazza, 1988; McCloskey, 1993; Sokol, McCloskey, Cohen, & Aliminosa, 
1991; but see also Bub & Bub, 1988; Robertson, Knight, Rafal, & Shimamura, 
1993; Zurif, Swinney, & Fodor, 1991).  
1.1.1.1. Goals of studying cognitive deficits 
To understand how the brain enables the mind, cognitive deficits can be studied 
for two different purposes. First, impairments offer a window into how cognitive 
processes are functionally organized. Experimental data from brain-damaged 
individuals can be studied to understand normal cognitive processes (Coltheart, 
2001), most directly corresponding to Marr’s (1982) 
algorithmic/representational level of analysis. How information is processed in 
the human cognitive system is sometimes revealed more clearly when the 
system has been damaged than when all processes remain intact (McCloskey, 
2001). When used for informing cognitive theories only, studies of cognitive 
deficits aim to identify the locus of the functional lesion within the cognitive 
system (Caramazza & McCloskey, 1988). For this purpose, knowledge about the 
neuroanatomical lesion locus is not necessary, because nothing in the logic of 
                                                
2  Studies of cognitive deficits typically also present evidence that the brain-damaged 
individual was cognitively intact prior to the brain damage. 
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inference about behavioral patterns of performance hinges on the anatomical 
locus of injury (Caramazza, 1992; Frith, 1998).  
However, in addition to providing evidence about the functional organization 
of cognition, data from brain-damaged patients also offer a window into how 
cognitive functions are physically implemented in the brain (Rorden & Karnath, 
2004). When brain-damaged individuals are studied for this purpose, 
neuroanatomical lesion loci are obviously the topic of interest. In practice, many 
factors limit the usefulness of patient studies for this purpose (Price, Noppeney, 
& Friston, 2006; Shallice, 1988). For example, lesion loci can be large, diffuse, 
and brain damage can fail to respect boundaries of anatomical structure or 
functional interest. At the same time, however, experimental evidence from a 
brain-damaged patient can establish a causal role for a brain structure in a 
cognitive function that cannot be established through other methods alone (e.g., 
Chatterjee, 2005; D'Esposito, 2010).  
1.1.2. Electrophysiological methods and functional neuroimaging 
Electrophysiological tools and functional neuroimaging techniques provide 
several methods for studying brain function in living human subjects. Similarly 
to studies of brain-damaged patients and behavioral experiments with healthy 
subjects, both electromagnetic and hemodynamic neuroimaging methods also 
rely on the universality assumption. The methods relevant for the purposes of 
this thesis are electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography 
(MEG), measuring electric and magnetic brain activity, respectively, and the 
hemodynamic techniques of positron emission tomography (PET) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  
For investigating questions related to the neural implementation of cognitive 
functions in the brain, electrophysiological and hemodynamic neuroimaging 
methods provide several advantages over patient studies. For example, brain 
regions of interest are not restricted to a particular area (i.e., one that is 
damaged), but neural activation can be studied in the whole brain. Second, 
research questions are not limited to the areas that are most susceptible to 
neural insult. Although brain damage can be caused in different ways, some 
regions tend to be more vulnerable than others, for example, because of how the 
system of blood circulation is organized in the brain. Conceivably, this could 
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skew the choice of topics that are studied in patients, whereas neuroimaging 
methods are less sensitive to vascular anatomy. Third, neuroimaging 
experiments on healthy participants can be replicated in new samples. 
Some authors contend that functional neuroimaging methods can also 
inform theories of cognitive function at the psychological level (Henson, 2005; 
Jonides et al., 2006; Love, 2015; Wixted & Mickes, 2013). However, this is 
under debate (Coltheart, 2006a; 2006b; Loosemore & Harley, 2010; Page, 
2006). 
1.1.2.1. Electromagnetic measures 
The electromagnetic signals generated by synchronized mass-activity of 
neuronal populations in the brain can be measured non-invasively from the 
scalp (Baillet, 2011; Hämäläinen, Hari, Ilmoniemi, Knuutila, & Lounasmaa, 
1993; Luck, 2014). Electric potential differences created by brain activity can be 
recorded using EEG. A closely related method, MEG, measures the magnetic 
fields created by intracellular currents in the brain. The electric and magnetic 
data can be used to estimate the spatial distribution of the underlying neural 
sources (Cohen, 1968; Michel et al., 2004).  
MEG is thought to be predominantly sensitive to postsynaptic currents in the 
apical dendrites of large pyramidal neurons (Hämäläinen et al., 1993). MEG 
mainly records activity from neurons in fissures of the cortex, where dendrites 
are oriented more or less tangentially to the skull (but see also Papadelis, 
Leonardelli, Staudt, & Braun, 2012). In source localization, MEG is considered 
superior to EEG because unlike electric potentials measured by EEG, magnetic 
fields are not influenced by the physical structures of the skull, the brain, and 
other tissue between the sources and sensors (Hämäläinen et al., 1993; Leahy, 
Mosher, Spencer, Huang, & Lewine, 1998).  
In both EEG and MEG, the interpretation of the data requires dealing with 
the inverse problem. That is, the source(s) of a recorded electromagnetic signal 
cannot be uniquely determined from the measured signal alone, but source 
models, such as current dipoles, or other estimation techniques are required. 
One of the limitations of these techniques is that the signal-to-noise ratio is 
weak, and typically a large number of trials is needed. While the spatial 
resolution of MEG and especially EEG is limited relative to hemodynamic 
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measures, their temporal resolution is much more precise. Recent 
methodological advances have provided potential ways of analyzing MEG data 
for improved spatial resolution (Cichy, Ramirez, & Pantazis, 2015; Stokes, 
Wolff, & Spaak, 2015), and many sophisticated methods exist also for EEG 
(Luck, 2014). 
1.1.2.2. Hemodynamic methods 
In contrast to electromagnetic measures, the hemodynamic neuroimaging 
techniques PET and fMRI are indirect measures of neuronal activity. They 
exploit the fact that metabolism and blood flow are enhanced locally when 
activity in an area of the brain increases (Wager, Hernandez, Jonides, & 
Lindquist, 2007).  
PET is a semi-invasive technique that depends on the injection of radioactive 
isotope markers into the bloodflow. It is based on measuring local quantities of 
the metabolic correlates of neuronal activity (Posner & Raichle, 1994). PET can 
be used to detect local differences in glucose metabolism, oxygen consumption, 
and regional cerebral blood flow during cognitive activity.  
Functional MRI, in contrast, is a newer and currently the dominant 
functional neuroimaging technique. Most fMRI studies in cognitive 
neuroscience use the blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, which 
is based on the paramagnetic properties of deoxygenated blood (Ogawa, Lee, 
Kay, & Tank, 1990; Song, Huettel, & McCarthy, 2006; Wager et al., 2007; Wager 
& Lindquist, 2011). The BOLD response can be used to measure changes in the 
ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated hemoglobin in the blood that accompany 
changes in neural activity. Spatial resolution is considered the main advantage 
of fMRI, while its temporal resolution is coarser than that of EEG and MEG. As 
a non-invasive technique, it also has clear practical advantages over PET (but 
also some disadvantages, see Raichle, 2006). Over the last two decades, the 
interest in the use of fMRI has increased dramatically. FMRI has surpassed all 
other cognitive neuroscience methods in popularity and come to hold a 
prominent position in research practices (e.g., Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Fellows 
et al., 2005; Raichle, 2006; Wager et al., 2007). 
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1.2. Cognitive representations and multiple methods  
Through empirical examples, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate how 
different methods in cognitive neuroscience can provide complementary 
evidence about cognitive representations in visual information processing and 
memory at multiple levels of analysis. Empirical evidence was used from 
cognitive deficits and MEG to investigate cognitive representations and their 
neural basis in visual information processing and memory. The aim was both to 
collect new experimental evidence about cognitive representations and their 
neural basis in the intact cognitive system, and to use these studies as a context 
for discussing relative advantages of different methodological approaches in 
cognitive neuroscience. In particular, the aim was to evaluate merits and 
limitations of the single-patient approach, and to discuss how different methods 
can inform multiple levels of analysis in cognitive neuroscience.  
This thesis attempts to show (a) that detailed analyses of impaired 
performance in brain-damaged individuals can be used to systematize 
behavioral phenomena theoretically and to guide subsequent research on 
normal adults, normally developing children and studies using functional 
neuroimaging, (b) that a single-patient study of a brain-damaged individual can 
provide a strong form of evidence regarding how cognitive abilities are neurally 
supported in the human brain, and (c) that MEG, an electromagnetic brain-
research technique with excellent temporal resolution, can be used to collect 
fine-grained evidence about how disparate brain regions interact during 
cognitive processing. 
For this thesis, four empirical studies were conducted (Studies I-IV). Studies 
I and II are concerned with how the spatial orientation of objects is represented 
in the visual system. Studies III and IV investigated how the acquisition of new 
memory representations is neurally supported in the human brain and how 
different brain regions may interact during this process.  
The individual empirical studies will be introduced and discussed first in 
their theoretical contexts. Finally, methodological questions and implications 
for future studies will be discussed. 
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2. Part One: Representation of Object Orientation 
We typically take our sensory abilities for granted. Special circumstances 
excluded, we are mostly able to make sense easily of our everyday environment 
and to use this information adaptively. Our visual surroundings make sense to 
us without effort. We can recognize a fallen bike on the sidewalk just as easily as 
the adjacent one still standing against the fence, and we seldom fumble when 
reaching for the coffee mug on the kitchen table.  
A prerequisite for acting in all these situations is the ability to discern the 
spatial orientation of the objects we see. Reaching for objects requires accurate 
perception of the object’s spatial orientation; in reading and spelling, the 
identity of several letters depends on their spatial orientation. Evolutionarily 
speaking, knowing which way a predator is facing has often been a life-and-
death matter. Socially, understanding a situation between two people may hinge 
on whether they are facing each other or not.  
Although we are largely unaware of it, determining the spatial orientation of 
objects requires enormously complicated computations from the visual system. 
For any computational system, a demanding enough task would be to learn to 
recognize a potentially infinite number of objects that can come in any sizes or 
shapes. For the visual system, however, the task is even more challenging: the 
pattern of light-intensity reflected on our retinas from any single object can 
change completely when the same object is perceived from a different 
viewpoint, but the system needs to recognize it reliably as the same object. 
Despite the colossal computational demands, the visual system is mostly able to 
solve these problems rapidly and outside our awareness.  
A key concept in the psychological research of perception and memory is 
cognitive representation. These internal representations constructed of objects 
and events are not always veridical, but it is these representations that 
ultimately enable us to act and function in the world, to see, hear and 
remember. Although we are still far from fully understanding how the human 
cognitive system meets computational challenges such as the ones related to 
discerning the spatial orientation of perceived objects, one way to advance our 
understanding of these processes is by examining the underlying cognitive 
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representations. Our ability to appreciate the different spatial orientations of 
whole objects depends crucially on the cognitive representations constructed of 
these objects. Part One of this dissertation aims to understand the nature of 
these representations and how the spatial orientation of visually perceived 
objects is processed. 
2.1. Orientation processing in the primate visual system 
The majority of cells in the primary visual cortex of primates and many other 
non-human animals are sensitive to spatial orientation. Hubel and Wiesel’s 
(1962; 1968) ground-breaking discovery of simple cells in primary visual cortex 
that respond selectively to differently oriented edges introduced visual cortical 
orientation selectivity as a central question for understanding the 
neurophysiology of vision (e.g., Ferster & Miller, 2000; Ferster, 2003; Shapley 
& Ringach, 2000; Shapley, Hawken, & Ringach, 2003; Somers, Nelson, & Sur, 
1995; Wurtz, 2009). 
During cortical processing, the visual system is thought to extract spatial 
information from a visual scene by means of multiple visual filters, or channels, 
each of which is sensitive to a narrow band of spatial frequencies and 
orientations  (e.g., Wilson & Wilkinson, 2003). From primary visual cortex V1, 
visual information is carried in parallel in two divergent visual pathways, both 
of which carry information about orientation: in a ventral stream projecting to 
the inferotemporal (IT) cortex, and in a dorsal stream projecting to the posterior 
parietal cortex (Milner & Goodale, 2006; Ungerleider & Pasternak, 2003). The 
ventral stream is considered important for visual object recognition, and the 
dorsal, in contrast, for visual functions that enable reaching for objects and 
interacting with them. Within the ventral processing stream of macaque 
monkeys, individual neurons that are sensitive to complex object shapes and 
their orientations have been identified in the IT area (Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & 
Bender, 1972; Vogels & Orban, 1994). Similarly, neurons responsive to objects 
and their orientations have been found in the caudal intraparietal sulcus of the 
parietal cortex, consistent with the notion that the parietal lobe houses 
functions related to orientation processing and hand guidance for action (Sakata 
et al., 1998).  
  25
Despite these and many other important findings, however, the available 
neurophysiological evidence does not directly speak to how the spatial 
orientation of entire objects is represented. Presumably, computing the 
orientation of whole objects requires higher-level representations that are not 
reducible to, for example, the receptive fields properties of single neurons 
sensitive to simple visual features, such as edges, or even to complex shapes 
(Corballis & Beale, 1976; Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006; Marr, 1982; McCloskey, 
2009; Wilson & Wilkinson, 2003).  
2.1.1. Behavioral evidence for orientation processing 
In sum, the available neurophysiological evidence does not specify the nature of 
the higher-order representations needed for discerning the spatial orientation of 
whole objects. Therefore, important evidence for how the orientation of entire 
objects is represented in the brain comes from behavioral studies with human 
children and adults, non-human animals, and individuals with brain damage. In 
particular, research related to mirror-reflected and obliquely oriented objects 
has important implications for how the orientation of whole objects is 
processed. Empirically, both mirror images and oblique orientations of objects 
have been found demanding to process. Studying the related processing errors 
can potentially help in understanding how spatial information is represented. 
2.1.1.1. Mirror reflections: Developmental evidence 
Many animal species and human children up to around the age of seven find it 
very difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to discriminate between visual 
stimuli that have been reflected across a vertical axis (Bornstein, 1982; Corballis 
& Beale, 1976; Walsh & Butler, 1996). For example, Rudel and Teuber (1963) 
presented children with pairs of stimuli and asked them to indicate which one of 
the two was “correct”. The assignment was arbitrary, but the experimenter told 
the children after each trial whether their choice had been correct or incorrect. 
When the pair consisted of a horizontal and a vertical line ( ⎯ versus ⏐ ), even 
the youngest children, the 3-year-olds, learned to discriminate the stimuli 
correctly. In contrast, when required to discriminate between two oblique lines 
that were mirror images of each other ( / versus \ ), the same task proved 
extremely difficult for the 3-to-5-year-olds, and caused difficulties for many 
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even in the oldest age group, the 6-to-8-year-olds. Similarly, Gregory, Landau 
and McCloskey (2011) showed that 4-to-5-year-old children had consistent 
difficulties in orientation-matching tasks, and that the vast majority of their 
errors involved some of several forms of mirror-image confusion. Even normal 
human adults need substantially more time when comparing mirror-image 
obliques than with horizontal and vertical lines (Olson & Hildyard, 1977). 
It is not entirely clear why mirror images would be inherently difficult to 
distinguish. Corballis and Beale (1976) suggest that the brain may employ two 
mechanisms that could contribute to or explain mirror-image difficulties: 
duplication coding and reduction coding. Duplication coding refers to the 
possibility that the brain constructs and stores object descriptions in several 
alternate forms, one the left-right mirror image of the other. Several authors 
have proposed different formulations of duplication-coding accounts for mirror-
image difficulties (e.g., Deregowski, McGeorge, & Wynn, 2000; Rollenhagen & 
Olson, 2000). For example, Deregowski et al. (2000) suggest that the 
representation of three-dimensional shapes is achieved through duplication 
coding of two-dimensional images. 
Reduction coding, in contrast, refers to the possibility that the brain may 
store object descriptions that are independent of their left-right orientation. It is 
often argued that in many environments in the natural world, where biological 
symmetries are frequent, information about left-right orientation can often be 
unnecessary for identifying an object. For example, Braine (1978) has proposed 
that at a cognitive level, the process of visually identifying an object’s 
orientation progresses through three stages, some of which do not carry 
information about the objects’ left-right orientation. The first stage comprises a 
categorical judgment of whether an object is upright or not. At the second stage, 
the orientation of a non-upright object is further subcategorized as “upside 
down” or “sideways”, and at the third stage as “left-facing” or “right-facing”. 
Braine contends that left-right confusions occur at the second stage of 
processing, at which no information about left-right orientation is yet 
represented. According to her proposal, children confuse left-right orientations 
until they have reached the level of developmental maturity that the cognitive 
processing requires at the third stage. Braine’s proposal, however, is only 
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concerned with categorical judgments of up, down, left and right, although 
orientation perception is not a categorical but rather a continuous function. 
Braine suggests that in addition to categorical three-stage processes, also 
“relational” judgments of orientation are computed with respect to a spatial 
frame of reference. How such relations are represented, however, is unclear. It 
is also not entirely clear why the ability to perform left-right discriminations 
should necessarily mature developmentally later than that for up-down 
discriminations.  
While mechanisms such as duplication or reduction coding may contribute to 
difficulties with mirror images, some or many duplication coding accounts may 
also allow competing explanations (McCloskey, 2009). Further and more 
importantly, these mechanisms alone do not provide an adequate theory of 
orientation representation in the human brain. Despite the relative problems 
related to mirror images, humans are also capable of perceiving different 
orientations and of differentiating between left-right enantiomorphs. Therefore, 
a level of representation would seem to exist that also represents information 
about orientation accurately.  
In the case of obliquely oriented lines, a still third, alternative account for 
why mirror images are difficult has been presented. This third account posits 
that the cognitive representation for an oblique line orientation is more complex 
than that for a vertical or a horizontal line (Olson & Hildyard, 1977; Rudel & 
Teuber, 1963; Rudel, 1982). This complexity, however, has not been further 
elucidated. 
2.1.1.2. Mirror reflections: Evidence from brain damage 
Further behavioral evidence related to how orientation is represented comes 
from studies of individuals with cognitive deficits. Studies of brain-damaged 
individuals have shown that the capability to appreciate the orientation of whole 
objects can be selectively impaired after brain damage. Selective deficits in 
perceiving an object’s orientation can occur even when the ability to recognize 
the object is spared (Cooper & Humphreys, 2000; Best, 1917/Ferber & Karnath, 
2003; Fujinaga, Muramatsu, Ogano, & Kato, 2005; Harris, Harris, & Caine, 
2001; Karnath, Ferber, & Bülthoff, 2000; Priftis, Rusconi, Umiltà, & Zorzi, 
2003; Turnbull, Laws, & McCarthy, 1995; Turnbull, Beschin, & Della Sala, 
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1997). In a pattern of double-dissociation, patients have also been identified 
whose object recognition abilities have been severely impaired and who cannot 
name objects but who are able to perform tasks that require knowledge about 
their orientation (Turnbull, 1997). 
The ability to distinguish between mirror-reflected images can also be 
selectively impaired after brain damage (Davidoff & Warrington, 1999; 
Martinaud et al., 2016; McCloskey, 2009; Turnbull & McCarthy, 1996; Walsh, 
1996; Warrington & Davidoff, 2000). For example, patient FIM, who had 
sustained parieto-occipital damage, performed at chance when required to 
discriminate between mirror-reflected images, but her performance with 
rotated stimuli was considerably better (Davidoff & Warrington, 2001). Another 
patient, RJ, studied by Turnbull and McCarthy (1996), was able to name 
pictures of objects without error, and to distinguish which one of three stimuli 
differed from the others by a 180-degree rotation, but was unable to pick the 
odd-one-out when it was left-right reflected. Similarly, Priftis and colleagues’ 
(2003) patient GR was able to determine the correct orientations of objects and 
to distinguish between rotated stimuli. Despite these spared abilities, GR was 
profoundly impaired in mirror-image discrimination tasks. These results 
suggest that the patients had selective deficits in representing the left-right 
orientation of stimuli, but their ability to process at least some other aspects of 
object orientation had remained intact.  
Impairments in differentiating between mirror images have also been 
demonstrated with laterally reflected oblique lines. Patient LM, studied by 
Riddoch and Humphreys (1988), performed without difficulty in matching 
horizontal and vertical lines to sample, but was severely impaired at matching 
oblique lines when the distractors were mirror-reflected obliques. Patients MH 
(Riddoch et al., 2004) and AH (McCloskey et al., 1995; McCloskey, 2004; 2009) 
were also impaired at differentiating between mirror-reflected oblique lines.  
To explain patient FIM’s error pattern, Davidoff and Warrington (2001) 
hypothesized (in a manner consistent with many other reduction-coding 
accounts) that there are two routes to object identification in the intact brain. 
According to the proposal, one of these routes—the view-independent, or 
canonical route—uses representations with no information about left-right 
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orientation. In a somewhat similar account, also falling into the reduction-
coding family, Turnbull and McCarthy (1996) suggested that some processing 
stages in object recognition seem to carry no information about left-right 
orientation.  
In addition to reduction-coding proposals, some authors have explained 
mirror-image phenomena by positing abstract coordinate axes and reference 
frames that, presumably, could house orientation representations. For example, 
Riddoch and colleagues (2004) suggested that judging the orientation of line 
stimuli requires “coding concurrent variation along horizontal (x) and vertical 
(y) coordinates within a frame based on the patient’s body”. Somewhat 
similarly, Priftis et al. (2003) proposed that patient GR’s problems in mirror-
image discrimination resulted from a deficit “in processing the directionality of 
an object’s intrinsic x-axis.”  
Hypotheses based on coordinate-axes and reference-frames seem to have a 
certain advantage over reduction- and duplication-coding accounts. That is, 
reduction- and duplication-coding explanations fail to account for how different 
orientations can be perceived accurately; in contrast, a coordinate-axis account 
could, in principle, provide a full account of both orientation representation in 
the normal cognitive system and also of the various types of orientation error 
that can arise from deficits in processing. None of the previous suggestions, 
however, have been developed into explicit hypotheses. 
2.1.1.3. The oblique effect 
The challenges related to mirror-reflected lines may or may not be related to 
oblique stimuli in general. A well-established body of literature demonstrates 
that visual stimuli are more difficult to detect if they are presented in oblique 
rather than in cardinal orientations (Appelle, 1972; Corballis & Beale, 1976; Li, 
Peterson, & Freeman, 2003; Rudel, 1982; Shen, Tao, Zhang, Smith, & Chino, 
2014). This finding, referred to as the oblique effect, has been reported across a 
wide range of various experimental settings both in humans and many non-
human animals. 
Different neurophysiological accounts have been proposed to explain this 
anisotropy. For example, Mansfield (1974) suggested that the oblique effect 
results from a predominance of cortical neurons in V1 with receptive fields 
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responsive to horizontal and vertical as opposed to oblique stimuli. However, it 
seems unlikely that a neuronally low-level account can explain all the empirical 
phenomena evidenced with mirror-reflected oblique stimuli. For example, 
patient LM confused mirror-reflected oblique lines and left-right-reflected 
letters, but LM’s object recognition skills were comparatively better (Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 1988; Riddoch et al., 2004). That LM was (mostly) able to 
recognize objects would seem to imply that LM was able to code oblique edges 
of objects and use this information fairly accurately at least under some 
conditions. In addition, the oblique effect seems to vary across experimental 
settings (Heeley, Buchanan-Smith, Cromwell, & Wright, 1997; Li & Westheimer, 
1997; Shen et al., 2014; Westheimer, 2003). It therefore seems improbable that 
all the empirical findings in orientation acuity observed using oblique stimuli 
could be accounted for in the same way.3 
2.1.2. Summary 
In sum, various intriguing empirical phenomena related to orientation 
perception have been reported in neurophysiological, neuropsychological and 
behavioral studies with typically developing children, normal human adults, 
brain-damaged individuals and non-human animals. Prior research suggests 
that the orientation of entire objects is computed using higher-order 
representations that are not reducible to, for example, the receptive fields of 
simple cells in primary visual cortex. Further, particular empirical phenomena 
such as mirror-reflection errors suggest that at some processing level, visual 
information in these higher-order representations is coded in a form that does 
not distinguish between left and right handedness. The exact nature of these 
                                                
3 Further complicating the issue is that it is not entirely clear whether the difficulties in 
distinguishing between mirror-reflected oblique lines fall under the broader umbrella of mirror-
reflected visual objects in general. Some authors have argued that the visual system may treat 
lines differently from other shapes (Holmes & Gross, 1984; Walsh & Butler, 1996). According to 
Walsh and Butler (1996), single lines may lack salient visual features that the visual system can 
rely on when computing the orientation of entire objects. Nevertheless, whether the visual 
system treats lines in the same way as more complex objects or not, the cognitive system does 
seem to code both types of stimuli (at some level of representation) in a form that often leads to 
mirror-reflection errors at certain stages of normal visual development and in cases of brain 
damage, and even in normal human adults under particular circumstances. Whether or not the 
difficulties with mirror-reflected lines and other shapes arise from a single cause or from 
different causes, the exact nature of the cognitive representations has not been fully explicated 
for either class of stimuli. 
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higher-order representations, however, has not been explicitly discussed. 
Although several authors have suggested general coordinate-based frameworks 
to account for empirical phenomena such as mirror-image discrimination 
difficulties after brain damage, the details of such coordinate systems or the 
exact nature of the underlying orientation representations have not been fully 
explicated. 
2.2. Aims of Part One 
The general aim of Part One was to use empirical data to suggest an explicit 
cognitive-level hypothesis of how the spatial orientation of whole objects is 
represented in the brain. 
The specific aims of Part One were: 
• to investigate orientation errors in BC, a young woman with a 
developmental cognitive deficit affecting orientation perception, to 
inform hypotheses of how orientation is processed in the cognitive 
system (Study I), and 
• to suggest an explicit hypothesis concerning the nature of orientation 
representations that can be used as a theoretical framework for 
discussing and interpreting orientation-related empirical phenomena 
such as reflection errors (Study II) 
2.3. Methods 
2.3.1. Participants 
Study I investigated orientation errors in BC, a young woman who had acquired 
extensive bilateral occipital and parietal cortical damage at age three. She 
presents with a severe developmental deficit in processing visual and spatial 
information. 
2.3.2. Case report 
BC is a young left-handed woman, who was 15–16 years old at the time of 
testing. BC had sustained occipital and parietal damage after a presumed herpes 
encephalitis infection at age three (for detailed case report, see Study I). A 
structural MRI at age 5 revealed cortical damage in both left and right occipital 
regions, intruding into secondary and tertiary occipital and parietal regions in 
the left hemisphere. An ophthalmologic evaluation at age 14 reported dense 
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right hemianopia and a left visual field of 15–20°. Physical and occupational 
therapy evaluations at ages 8 and 9 reported that BC had problems related to 
spatial orientation, such as difficulty replicating postures and walking without a 
guide. 
In the present testing at Johns Hopkins University, BC presented as a young 
woman of normal intelligence. Her speech was fluent, and she picked up quickly 
on social cues and expressed herself in an age-appropriate manner. In contrast 
to her preserved intelligence and language abilities, an extremely profound 
visuo-spatial impairment was evident both in everyday life and in standardized 
and experimental neuropsychological testing. BC was often confused about 
locations within the space in which she was situated. She was able to reach for 
objects in front of her on the table, but the extent of her impairment was so 
pronounced that she was unwilling even to try walking unguided along a 
straight corridor without any obstacles. She had learned to read in Braille, but 
informal assessment suggested that her reading skills were not at the expected 
educational level. She was able to write some letters and numbers correctly, but 
made orientation errors on or was completely unable to write others. 
2.3.2.1. Neuropsychological assessment 
In the present neuropsychological assessment, BC's performance was 
profoundly impaired in practically all visuo-spatial tasks on which she was 
assessed. She was able to name simple geometric shapes such as circles and 
squares, but could not accurately name line drawings of objects. Her 
performance was in the 5–6-year-old range on the Boston Naming Test 
(Goodglass & Kaplan, 1983). On the Developmental Test of Visual Perception 
(DTVP-2, Hammill, Pearson, & Voress, 1993) assessing a range of visuo-spatial 
abilities, she scored at a six-year-old level or lower. In the Block Construction 
Test from the Differential Ability Scales (Elliot, 1990), her performance was at 
the level of a four-year-old. While she obtained a verbal digit span of 7, she was 
unable to repeat a visuo-spatial sequence of more than one item on the Corsi 
Block Span Task (Milner, 1971). BC’s performance was also impaired on the 
Birmingham object recognition battery (see Table 1, Riddoch & Humphreys, 
1993). 
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Table 1. BC’s performance on the Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 1993). 
 
Test Score 
Perception  
Line Length Match A (same/different) 19/30** 
large difference 5/5 
intermediate difference 3/5 
small difference 0/5 
identical 11/15 
Line Length Match B (same/different) 23/30** 
large difference 5/5 
intermediate difference 3/5 
small difference 2/5 
identical 13/15 
Circle Size Match A (same/different) 24/30* 
large difference 5/5 
intermediate difference 4/5 
small difference 3/5 
identical 12/15 
Circle Size Match B (same/different) 25/30 
large difference 5/5 
intermediate difference 4/5 
small difference 4/5 
identical 12/15 
Object Recognition  
Minimal Feature Match 20/25* 
Foreshortened Match 15/25** 
  
* Score 1 SD or more below published control data 
** Score 2 SD or more below published control data 
 
 
Tasks involving drawing proved particularly difficult for BC. Her drawing of a 
person was at the level of a three-year-old (Fig. 1), and when asked to draw a 
house, BC gave up after failing to produce a rectangle (Fig. 1). She was able to 
copy individual lines, but her performance broke down completely with all 
stimuli of any complexity (Fig. 2). Her age equivalent performance on a test 
requiring direct copying of visual figures, the Beery-Buktenica Developmental 
Test of Visuo-Motor Integration (VMI, Beery & Buktenica, 1997), was below that 
of a five-year-old (for an example, see Fig. 2). 
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Figure 1. BC’s drawings of a person and a house from Study I. 
 
 
Figure 2. Examples of BC’s direct copies from the VMI (Beery & Buktenica, 1997) from Study I. 
 
It is important to note that BC's extreme difficulties with visuo-spatial tasks 
cannot be attributed to her restricted visual field. Her visual field, albeit limited, 
is sufficient to support adequate performance in many of the tested tasks. In 
addition, her performance was equally deficient when stimuli were presented in 
the auditory or tactile modalities. Her profound difficulties suggest a more 
global or central deficit affecting the processing of all stimuli with visual or 
spatial properties. Informally, her deficit could be described as a severe 
reduction in the resources available for spatial processing.  
2.4. Experimental tasks 
2.4.1. Experiment 1: Same-different judgments of arrow orientation 
Pairs of arrows were presented visually, and BC was asked to judge for each pair 
whether the orientations of the arrows were the same or different. 
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2.4.1.1. Stimuli and procedure 
Each stimulus consisted of two black arrows printed on white paper. The arrows 
were composed of a straight line (35 mm in length) and a pointed arrowhead at 
one end. The two arrows were aligned vertically on the page (90 mm center to 
center), and each arrow was enclosed within a black circle. 
In each trial, BC was instructed to indicate whether or not the arrows were 
pointing in the same direction.  
A total of 124 stimulus pairs were presented. Of these, 40 arrow pairs were 
identical and 84 discrepant. In the discrepant pairs, the arrows differed in 
orientation by 30°–180°. 
2.4.1.2. Results 
The results showed that BC was impaired in detecting orientation differences 
that would be obvious to a normal observer (see Table 2). She responded 
correctly to all 40 of the identical pairs. However, she also identified 21% of the 
discrepant pairs as same, although all the orientation differences were 30° or 
greater. When the orientation difference between the lines was very large (90°–
180°), her responses were mostly correct (93%). In contrast, she detected 
differences of 30°–60° correctly only in 60% of the trials [χ2(1) = 13.3, p < .001]. 
Discrepant pairs in which the two arrows were lateral reflections of each 
other appeared to cause particular difficulty for BC. These were pairs in which, 
for example, one arrow was tilted 30° clockwise and the other 30° counter-
clockwise from the vertical. As shown in Table 2, her accuracy was 83% for non-
reflected discrepant pairs, and 86% for up-down reflections. In contrast, she 
was only 64% correct on the left-right reflected pairs [χ2(1)=3.94, p < .05 for 
left-right reflected pairs vs. the two other discrepant types combined]. 
These results suggest that in addition to difficulty in apprehending small 
angular differences, BC may also exhibit a specific tendency to confuse left-right 
reflected line stimuli. However, the stimuli were not designed to allow 
systematic comparisons among non-reflected, left-right-reflected and up-down 
reflected pairs. The next experiments were designed to investigate these issues 
systematically. 
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Table 2. BC’s accuracy for different pairs in Experiment 1. 
 
 Trial Type 
Orientation 
Difference 
Rotated 
 
Up-Down  
Reflected 
Left-Right  
Reflected 
Correct 
/Total 
% 
Correct 
Correct 
/Total 
% 
Correct 
Correct 
/Total 
% 
Correct 
30º 2/6 33% 0/2 0% 0/2 0% 
45º 9/12 75%     
60º   3/4 75% 2/4 50% 
90º 16/16 100% 10/10 100% 7/10 70% 
120º   4/4 100% 4/4 100% 
150º   2/2 100% 1/2 50% 
180º 6/6 100%     
Total 33/40 83% 19/22 86% 14/22 64% 
 
2.4.2. Experiment 2: Visual reproduction of line orientation 
Following the procedure developed by Dilks et al. (2004), a target and a 
response line were presented on a computer screen, and BC was instructed to 
match the orientation of the response line to that of the target by turning a dial 
on the table (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 2: BC sat in front of a computer screen showing a target line (top) and a 
response line (bottom). The response line rotated about its center when BC turned a dial on the 
table in front of her. Adapted from Study I. 
 
2.4.2.1. Stimuli and procedure 
BC sat in front of a computer monitor (distance 50 cm). The view on the screen 
was divided into two sections by a horizontal line. A target line of 6 cm in length 
and .3 cm in width (visual angle 6.8°) was displayed on the upper half of the 
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screen. A response line of 4.5 cm in length and .3 cm in width (visual angle 5.1°) 
was presented on the lower half of the screen. The midpoints of the target and 
response lines were aligned vertically (10.3 cm midpoint to midpoint). 
BC was instructed to turn a dial on the table in front of her to make the 
orientation of the lower (response) line look exactly like that of the upper 
(target) line. When the dial was turned clock- or counter-clockwise, the 
response line rotated in the corresponding direction about its midpoint. Both 
lines remained in view until BC indicated she was satisfied with the result. 
Because of BC’s restricted visual field, the target and response lines were 
explicitly pointed out to her at the beginning of every trial.  
The experiment was conducted in two parts, (a) and (b). In (a), BC was tested 
with 12 target orientations: -90° (with positive and negative values clock- and 
counterclockwise from vertical) through +75° in increments of 15°. Three trials 
were conducted for every target orientation, totaling 36 trials, which were 
presented in random order. At the beginning of each trial, the response line was 
45° or 90° from the target. BC was given three practice trials during which 
responses were not scored. In part (b), 36 additional trials were presented. 
Stimuli, design and procedure were identical to (a), except that both the target 
and response lines were each enclosed within a circle. 
2.4.2.2. Results 
BC’s performance was extremely inaccurate. For illustrative purposes, Figure 4 
shows BC’s responses in individual trials for all target orientations. 
BC’s responses can be compared to those of neurologically intact adults and 
normally developing children, tested by Dilks et al. (2004). Whereas the 
absolute errors of normal adults range from 1 to 3 degrees (mean absolute error 
1.6°, Dilks et al., 2004), BC’s errors ranged up to 88°, nearly the possible 
maximum. BC’s mean absolute error was 31° in part (a) of the experiment 
(range 1°–88°) and 27° in part (b) (range 3°–82°). This is also far poorer than 
the performance of normally developing children: The mean absolute error of 
the 10 healthy 5–7-year-old children Dilks et al. (2004) tested at the same task 
was only 4.8°, with a range of 3.0°–7.0°. 
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These results show that BC is profoundly impaired at reproducing the 
orientation of single lines, even when given unlimited time to respond and when 
the stimulus and response lines remain in view during the task.  
Interestingly, the result pattern also suggested that BC’s poor performance 
was not only due to general inaccuracy, but also to a tendency to mirror-reflect 
the orientation of the line for oblique targets. (See Figure 4.) As the pattern of 
performance was highly similar in parts (a) and (b) of the experiment, the 
results were collapsed across (a) and (b). Figure 5 shows BC’s responses in a 
scatterplot, with the target orientation on the x-axis and response orientation on 
the y-axis. Correct responses fall on the diagonal with a positive slope (solid line 
in Fig. 5), and mirror reflections on the diagonal with a negative slope (dashed 
line in Fig. 5). 
Across the 60 trials with oblique targets, BC’s responses were closer to the 
target orientation in 55% of trials and closer to the mirror-reflected orientation 
in 45% of trials. As can be seen in Figure 5, target and response tilt magnitude 
were correlated across the 27/60 wrong-direction responses BC made for 
oblique orientations: the response tilt magnitude varied systematically with the 
target tilt magnitude with a correlation of .63 (p < .01). The relationship 
between target and response tilt magnitude is also evident in the mean tilt 
magnitudes for each target: for target tilt magnitudes 15°, 30°, 45°, 60° and 90°, 
the mean response tilt magnitudes were 32°, 32°, 48°, 65° and 70°, respectively. 
These results demonstrate that BC showed a strong systematic tendency to 
mirror-reflect the target orientation in reproducing the visually presented line 
orientations: had the errors in BC’s responses been entirely due to random 
inaccuracy, no systematic relationship between target and response tilt 
magnitudes such as the one observed should be expected. In contrast, neither 
the normal adults nor the children tested by Dilks et al. (2004) made any 
reflection errors in the same task. 
In addition to mirror-reflecting oblique orientations, BC was also remarkably 
imprecise in her responses. This was the case both for responses in which the 
tilt direction was correct and for those in which it was incorrect. The mean tilt 
magnitude error in BC’s responses was 20.3° for horizontal and vertical targets, 
and 10.9° for correct-direction responses to oblique targets. For wrong-direction 
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responses, the mean tilt magnitude error from the target’s perfect mirror 
reflection was 15.7°. The level of imprecision in BC’s responses is considerable, 
as both normal adults and normally developing 5–7-year-old children are far 
more accurate in the same task (mean absolute error 1.6° and 4.8°, respectively, 
Dilks et al., 2004). Therefore, the results suggest two forms of impairment: a 
strong tendency to mirror-reflect the target, and greater-than-normal 
imprecision in reproducing tilt magnitude. 
 
 
Figure 4. BC’s responses in Experiment 2: visual reproduction of line orientation. The thick 
lines depict the target orientation and the thin lines show individual responses. BC’s responses 
were highly inaccurate, errors ranging up to the possible maximum. The pattern of performance 
suggests she often mirror-reflected the target. Depicted results are from Experiment 2a. Mean 
absolute errors are averaged across all three trials per target orientation. Adapted from Study I. 
 
It is unlikely that BC’s error pattern could be explained solely by her 
restricted visual field. The Dilks et al. (2004) study also included a condition in 
which—unlike in the present experiment—a 5-second delay was introduced after 
the participant had viewed the target line and before the response line was 
displayed. Under these conditions, when the participants were not allowed to 
look back and forth between the target and response lines when adjusting their 
response, the neurologically healthy adults still made no mirror-reflection 
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errors in the Dilks et al. (2004) study, and even the 5–7-year-old children made 
very few. The normal adults also remained far more accurate (mean absolute 
error 3.8°, range 2.0°–5.2°) than BC, even with the delay. Despite being about 
10 years younger, the performance of the 5–7-year-olds was roughly comparable 
in the delay-condition (mean absolute error 15.9°, range 8.1°–21.1°) to BC’s 
under no delay. These results show that merely preventing the subjects from 
seeing both lines does not introduce the type or degree of error observed in BC’s 
responses. Together, these results strongly suggest that BC’s imprecision in 
reproducing line orientations is both greater than and qualitatively different 
from that expected solely on the basis of her limited visual field. 
 
 
Figure 5. A scatterplot of BC’s responses from individual trials (y-axis) as a function of target 
orientation (x-axis) in Experiment 2. Responses fall along two opposite diagonals: the solid line 
depicts correct target orientations, and the dashed line depicts the target’s mirror reflection. 
Adapted from Study I. 
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2.4.3. Experiment 3: Tactile reproduction of line orientation 
The previous experiments demonstrated that BC has a tendency to mirror-
reflect obliquely oriented line stimuli when they are visually presented. The aim 
of this experiment was to investigate whether this tendency would extend to the 
tactile modality. While seated at a table and blindfolded, BC was presented with 
a fixed wooden stick and instructed to feel it with her hands, and then to rotate a 
response stick to match the target orientation. 
2.4.3.1. Stimuli and procedure 
The experiment was conducted in two parts, (a) and (b). The response 
apparatus consisted of a wooden stick (length 11.5 cm, width 1 cm, thickness 2 
mm) mounted to a flat surface with a bolt through its center. When the stick was 
turned, it rotated about its center. 
In part (a) of the experiment, the target was a wooden stick (length 36 mm, 
width 2 mm, thickness 2 mm) fixed to a flat surface. The target was placed 
directly in front of BC, and the response apparatus to the left of the target. BC 
was instructed to turn the response stick to make its orientation match the 
target. BC felt the target with her right hand and rotated the response stick with 
her left. The target orientations ranged from -90° through +75° (from vertical, 
negative values counter-clockwise) in increments of 15°. Each orientation was 
tested in 1–3 trials, totaling 18 trials. 
In part (b), the stick used as the target was identical in size to the response 
stick. The target was positioned directly in front of BC, as in part (a), but in part 
(b), the response stick was placed on the table farther away with the midpoints 
of the sticks aligned. In part (b), BC was instructed to use her (dominant) left 
hand to feel the stimulus and to adjust the response stick. She was encouraged 
to go back and forth between the target and response sticks as often as 
necessary. The target orientations were the same as in part (a), tested in a total 
of 24 trials. In both parts, she was given unlimited time to respond and was 
encouraged to readjust her responses until she felt satisfied with the results. 
2.4.3.2. Results 
BC’s pattern of performance was very similar to that seen in the previous 
experiments with visual stimuli. The mean absolute error in BC’s responses was 
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29.0° (range 0°–89°). Examples of her responses are shown in Figure 6, and the 
scatterplot in Figure 7 shows her responses for all target orientations. 
Target 30°
A. Experiment 3a
Target 30° Target 60°
B. Experiment 3b
Target 45°
 
 
Figure 6. Examples of BC’s reflection errors in Experiment 3: tactile reproduction of line 
orientation. Thick lines depict the target orientation, and thin lines responses in individual 
trials. The response and target sticks were horizontally and vertically aligned in Experiments 3a 
and 3b, respectively. Adapted from Study I. 
 
 
As in reproducing visual line orientations, BC’s responses displayed both 
general imprecision and a tendency to mirror-reflect target orientations. 
Mirror-reflected responses occurred both in parts (a) and (b) of the experiment. 
Wrong-direction responses were observed in 41% (12/29) of all oblique-target 
trials. Among these trials, the correlation between target and response tilt 
magnitude was .27. In this experiment, the correlation was not statistically 
significant. However, the finding that the correlation did not reach significance 
may have been due to a combination of a small number of data points (fewer 
than half of those in the previous experiment), and a single outlier in which the 
response was extremely far off target (response -82° for a target of 30°). When 
this outlier is excluded, the correlation rises to .47. 
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Figure 7. A scatterplot of BC’s responses in individual trials (y-axis) as a function of target 
orientation (x-axis) in Experiment 3. Responses fall along two opposite diagonals: the solid line 
depicts correct target orientations and the dashed line depicts the target’s mirror reflection. 
Adapted from Study I. 
 
Considering the overall pattern of results (see Figures 6 and 7), the 
scatterplot suggests that similarly to the pattern seen in the previous 
experiment, BC was responding to the target’s tilt magnitude also when her 
responses were in the wrong direction. As in the previous experiment with 
visual stimuli, BC’s responses also displayed considerable imprecision in 
addition to a tendency to mirror-reflect target orientations. The mean absolute 
distance from target orientation was 13.3° for correct-direction responses, and 
18.2° from the mirror-reflected target orientation for wrong-direction 
responses. 
Overall, the pattern of responses closely resembles that observed in the 
previous experiment with visual stimuli (see Figures 4 and 5). These results 
suggest that BC’s impairments in processing and representing line orientations 
affect information from both visual and tactile sensory modalities. 
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2.4.4. Experiment 4: Lines with differentiated ends 
Experiments 2 and 3 used stimuli that were identical at both ends. In the case of 
mirror-reflection errors, however, such stimuli cannot distinguish between 
lateral and horizontal reflections. That is, an erroneous -45° response to a +45° 
target could equally result from a lateral mirror-reflection (across a vertical 
axis), or from a horizontal mirror-reflection (across a horizontal axis). The next 
experiment was conducted to distinguish between lateral and horizontal mirror-
reflection errors. 
2.4.4.1. Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2, except that one 
end of the target and response lines was modified to have a red tip. Each line 
was enclosed in a circle. 
To rule out the possibility that BC’s performance might be affected by a 
particular alignment of the stimulus and response lines on the screen, the 
experiment was conducted in two parts. In part (a), the target and response 
were aligned vertically on the screen, and in part (b), horizontally.  
The target orientations were -180° through +165° in increments of 15°, 
totaling 24 orientations. In both parts of the experiment, each orientation was 
tested in four trials. One trial in part (b) was discarded due to experimenter 
error. Otherwise stimuli and procedure were identical to those in 2.4.2. 
2.4.4.2. Results 
As in the previous experiments, BC’s responses were extremely inaccurate. The 
mean absolute error was 27.0° and 31.1° in parts (a) and (b), respectively. As in 
the preceding experiments, the pattern of results suggested BC’s responses were 
not only generally imprecise, but her errors sometimes took the form of mirror-
reflections. 
BC’s responses to all oblique targets were classified into four categories (see 
Fig. 8). These were the four possible quadrants defined by the horizontal and 
vertical axes through the midpoint of the target line and according to the 
location of the line’s red tip. The responses were categorized as 1) correct-
quadrant, 2) left-right adjacent quadrant, 3) up-down adjacent quadrant, or 4) 
opposite-quadrant. 
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Figure 8. The four categories into which responses were sorted in Experiment 4: correct-
quadrant, left-right adjacent quadrant, up-down adjacent quadrant, and opposite quadrant. The 
black dot at one end of each line shows the location of the red tip. Adapted from Study I. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the breakdown of responses across these categories in parts (a) 
and (b) of the experiment. The pattern was virtually identical in the two 
experiments (χ2 < 1). Collapsing across (a) and (b), 65% of responses fell into 
the correct quadrant, 26% into the left-right adjacent and 8% into the up-down 
adjacent quadrant. Very few responses (1%) fell into the opposite quadrant. 
These results clearly show BC’s responses were sensitive to the location of the 
target line’s red tip: Correct-quadrant responses were more frequent than 
opposite-quadrant responses (104 vs. 1, p< .001 by binomial test), and left-right 
adjacent responses were more frequent than up-down adjacent responses (41 vs. 
13, p < .001). That many of BC’s responses fell into the left-right adjacent 
quadrant also suggests that many of her errors may have been lateral (left-right) 
mirror-reflection errors. 
Figure 9 shows BC’s responses in all individual trials in a scatterplot. Because 
one end of the line was marked with a red tip, the maximum possible error was 
180° (unlike in the previous experiments, in which it was 90° because the lines’ 
ends were indistinguishable). As in the previous scatterplots, correct responses 
again lie along the major diagonal with a positive slope (depicted with a solid 
line). Left-right reflected responses fall along the major diagonal with a negative 
slope (depicted with a dashed line). Up-down reflections fall along two minor 
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negative-slope diagonals (depicted with a dotted line), which are in the upper-
right and lower-left parts of the scatterplot. 
 
 
Figure 9. A scatterplot showing BC’s responses (y-axis) in individual trials as a function of 
target orientation (x-axis) in Experiment 4. Responses fall along four diagonals: the solid line 
with a positive slope (lower left to upper right) depicts correct target orientations, the central 
falling diagonal (upper left to lower right) depicts left-right reflections, and the two shorter 
dotted lines with negative slopes depict up-down reflections. The majority of the reflection 
responses occurred in the left-right direction. Adapted from Study I. 
 
The scatterplot shows that the majority of responses fell along either the 
correct-response diagonal, or along the left-right reflection diagonal. To further 
investigate whether the responses on the left-right diagonal were true reflection 
responses—i.e., ones that were sensitive to the tilt magnitude of the target 
orientation despite being tilted in the wrong direction—we calculated the 
correlation between target and response tilt magnitude across all left-right 
adjacent responses and the opposite-quadrant responses4. The correlation was 
                                                
4 This correlation collapses the upper-left and lower-right quadrants of the scatterplot into a 
single square region. Including the one opposite-quadrant response as well as left-right adjacent 
  47
extremely high, .92 (p< .001). This rules out the possibility that the left-right 
adjacent responses were not sensitive to the target line’s tilt magnitude and 
supports the conclusion that BC often made true left-right reflection errors in 
her responses. 
As in the previous experiments, BC’s responses again showed considerable 
imprecision, both when they fell along the correct-response diagonal and when 
they fell closer to the left-right reflection of the target orientation. Her mean 
absolute error was 12.7° for correct-quadrant responses, and 18.1° for left-right 
adjacent responses (as measured as the mean distance from the target’s perfect 
left-right reflection).  
Far fewer of BC’s responses fell into the up-down adjacent (8%) than into the 
left-right adjacent quadrant. The pattern in the up-down adjacent responses 
makes it unclear whether any of these responses were in fact true up-down 
reflections.  The vast majority of these responses (10/13) involved target 
orientations only 15° away from horizontal, and the remaining ones (3/13) were 
responses to targets only 30° away from horizontal. Given the degree of 
imprecision in BC’s responses overall, random imprecision alone could account 
for these errors. As some of BC’s correct-quadrant responses fell off target by as 
much as 50°, it seems likely that at least some of the responses that fell into the 
up-down adjacent quadrant resulted from general imprecision. However, it is 
also possible that some of BC’s up-down adjacent quadrant responses were true 
reflection errors. 
In contrast, it is important to note that BC’s left-right reflection errors cannot 
be attributed to random imprecision alone. As can be seen in the scatterplot, 
left-right reflections occurred not only for orientations close to the vertical axis, 
but also for orientations that were far from vertical; for example, for targets 
such as 45°. These errors clearly cannot be interpreted as resulting from 
random imprecision alone.  
In sum, the results confirmed the findings from the preceding experiments 
showing that BC exhibits imprecision and reflection errors in representing line 
orientations. The results demonstrate that BC’s mirror-reflection errors 
                                                                                                                                          
responses ensures that the area is in fact square, and therefore that the correlation could in 
principle range from -1.0 to 1.0. 
  48 
predominantly (or perhaps entirely) take the form of lateral reflections (across a 
vertical axis). 
 
Table 3. BC's responses for oblique targets in Experiment 4, classified according to their 
location among the four possible quadrants defined relative to the target orientation (correct 
quadrant, left-right adjacent, up-down adjacent, opposite). 
 
 Experimental condition 
 
 Vertical alignment Horizontal alignment Collapsed 
Response 
location 
N % N % N % 
Correct quadrant 
 
52/80 65% 52/79 66% 104/159 65% 
Left-right 
adjacent 
22/80 28% 19/79 24% 41/159 26% 
Up-down 
adjacent 
6/80 7% 7/79 9% 13/159 8% 
Opposite 
quadrant 
0/80 0% 1/79 1% 1/159 1% 
Total 80/80 100% 79/79 100% 159/159 100% 
 
2.4.5. Discussion 
The results of four experiments showed that BC was profoundly impaired in 
discriminating and reproducing line orientations, and that in addition to 
general imprecision, her errors involved left-right reflections. The results 
showed that the reflection errors did not arise from random imprecision, but 
her responses were sensitive to the target orientation’s tilt magnitude. The 
pattern of results also indicated that BC’s errors could not be accounted for by 
attributing them to a visuo-motor impairment. Her responses were consistent 
across the four experiments, although the visuo-motor requirements differed 
widely: in same-different judgments the response was verbal, in visual 
orientation reproduction tasks it was turning a dial to adjust the orientation of 
the line, and in the tactile task it was turning a wooden stick blindfolded. Across 
the different tasks, BC’s responses showed imprecision in processing target tilt 
  49
magnitude, and a strong tendency to mirror-reflect the target, predominantly 
(or only) in the left-right direction. 
BC’s reflection errors can be interpreted by assuming that the underlying 
orientation representations are compositional. The suggestion presented here is 
that at some level(s) of mental representation, the orientation of a line is 
represented with respect to a reference axis (e.g., vertical), such that tilt 
direction and magnitude are represented separately. BC’s reflection errors can 
be interpreted by assuming that she sometimes fails to represent the direction 
of tilt from a vertical reference axis. Although she is able to encode tilt 
magnitude, she appears to do so with less than normal precision.  
The results from the tactile experiment also showed that BC’s deficit affected 
not only her visual processing, but also her processing of tactile stimuli. This 
result can be interpreted by assuming that the problem arises at a processing 
level higher than vision—i.e., at a multi-modal level of representation. 
Alternatively, the result can be interpreted by assuming that the brain uses 
visual-like representations in processing the orientation of tactile objects. 
The proposal that orientation representations have compositional structure 
can be seen as making earlier suggestions in the literature more explicit. Rudel 
and Teuber (1963), Olson and Hildyard (1977) and Rudel (1982) have suggested 
that oblique line orientations have a more complex representational structure 
than cardinal orientations. The proposed representational structure is 
consistent with this suggestion and makes the complexity of obliques and the 
priority of a vertical meridian more explicit.  
The interpretation of BC’s orientation errors will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the context of the representational framework, the COR 
hypothesis, which will be presented next. 
2.5. Representation of orientation: The COR hypothesis 
Several authors have discussed orientation errors and their implications for 
cognitive processing, but these suggestions have not been developed into an 
explicit theoretical framework of how the orientation of entire objects is 
represented in the human brain. Such a framework was proposed in Study II. 
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One of the motivations for constructing a theoretical framework to allow 
discussion of orientation representations was the observation that when 
orientation errors occur, they can take one of many forms. Although several 
qualitatively different orientation errors are possible (see Figures 10 and 11), 
these are often not differentiated. In many empirical studies of orientation—
including the one with BC described above—several different kinds of errors 
have become conflated. 
 
 
Figure 10. Tilt errors. (A) Stimulus figure. (B) Tilt direction error. (C) Tilt magnitude error. 
Reproduced from Study II. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Reflection errors. (A) A stimulus figure can be reflected (B) across the object’s 
principal axis, (C) across the object’s secondary axis, (D) across an external vertical axis, (E) or 
across an external horizontal axis. Reproduced from Study II. 
 
For example, reflecting a simple oblique vertical line across an external 
vertical axis results in a transformation that looks identical to one resulting 
from reflection across a horizontal axis, and when rotated 90° clockwise—and 
even when rotated 90° counterclockwise. Even if one end of the line is 
distinguished from the other—as in Experiment 4—the stimulus still remains 
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bilaterally symmetric relative to its own principal axis. Bilaterally symmetric 
stimuli cannot differentiate between tilt direction errors and reflections across 
an external axis. Similarly, stimuli that are not tilted cannot differentiate 
between reflections across an object’s own axis of elongation and those across 
an external axis. 
Until recently, most authors seem to have assumed that reflection errors 
always take the form of left-right reflections across an extrinsic vertical axis. 
Empirically, however, this is clearly not always the case. Gregory and McCloskey 
(2010) found that adults’ errors were not primarily external-axis left-right 
reflections, but reflections across an object axis. In contrast, young children’s 
mirror-reflections included both object-axis reflections and left-right reflections 
across an external vertical axis (Gregory et al., 2011). 
In most studies that have investigated orientation processing of whole 
objects—including Study I presented here—the stimuli have been inadequate for 
differentiating between different types of orientation errors, such as object-axis 
versus external-axis reflections. One of the suggestions of this thesis is that in 
future studies of object orientation, it would be useful to choose stimuli complex 
and asymmetric enough to allow differentiating between the various different 
types of potential orientation errors. The framework proposed in Study II, the 
coordinate-system orientation representation (COR) hypothesis, aims to help 
in clarifying the types of spatial relations potentially involved in orientation 
processing and in systematizing how orientation errors and representations are 
discussed. 
2.5.1. The representation of orientation and spatial location 
The COR hypothesis is based on McCloskey and colleagues’ prior work on how 
spatial locations are represented. McCloskey and colleagues (McCloskey, 2004; 
2009) proposed that at some level of the visual system, the locations of objects 
are represented in a mental spatial coordinate system. In this coordinate 
system, the locations of objects are represented as their distance and direction 
of displacement along orthogonal axes from an origin. 
McCloskey and colleagues’ proposal was based on evidence from patient AH, 
a young woman with a rare developmental visual deficit. In numerous tasks 
across various different conditions, AH made localization errors that took the 
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form of left-right reflections across a vertical axis. For example, in a task 
requiring her to reach to an object on the table to the left of her, AH would often 
reach for an accurate distance, but to the opposite side. When the object was on 
the far right from her, she would often incorrectly reach far left; when the object 
was close to her on the left, she often reached near right.  
According to McCloskey and colleagues (McCloskey, 2009), AH’s location 
errors can be interpreted within the proposed spatial coordinate system as a 
selective visual deficit that arises from computations in which the distance of an 
object along the reference axes is accurately represented whereas the direction 
of displacement is not. According to the proposed coordinate system, 
misrepresenting the direction of an object (e.g., 30 cm from a reference point) 
along a horizontal reference axis (e.g., as RIGHT instead of LEFT) should lead 
to a reflection error that is sensitive to the object’s distance from the origin 
(correctly 30 cm from the reference point) but in which the direction is incorrect 
(i.e., to the right instead of left).  
In the COR hypothesis, this coordinate system is applied to the 
representation of object orientation. 
2.5.2. The coordinate-system orientation representation hypothesis 
The COR hypothesis assumes that, unlike location representations, orientation 
representations involve relationships between different reference frames. The 
COR hypothesis assumes that at some level(s) of representation in the visual 
system, the orientation of an object is cognitively represented as a relationship 
between (a) an object-centered frame of reference and (b) a second external 
reference frame. 
This proposal assumes that an object-based representation first defines how 
the component elements of an object are arranged. The object’s principal axis of 
elongation and a secondary axis, orthogonal to the principal axis, define an 
object-centered reference frame. The arrangement of all the object’s component 
elements is specified according to this reference frame, and this arrangement 
within the frame forms the object-based representation. The location and tilt of 
all object parts are defined in this frame in relation to the principal axis of 
elongation. By definition, however, this object-based representation carries no 
information about the entire object’s orientation, as orientation must be defined 
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in relation to an external reference frame. In contrast, the object-based 
representation does determine whether any object parts are tilted in relation to 
the principal axis of elongation. 
The orientation of an object in relation to the outside world is defined 
through a second reference frame external to the object. This external reference 
frame could be defined in relation to the viewer’s body or, for example, the 
direction of gravity. The COR hypothesis does not make explicit claims as to 
how the axes of this external frame are defined; for present purposes, the only 
crucial assumption is that an external frame with orthogonal axes is used 
(referred to here as “vertical” and “horizontal”). It is further assumed that both 
axes are assigned a polarity, such that one end can be referred to (arbitrarily) as 
positive and the other end as negative.  
Given the object-based representation and an external reference frame, the 
orientation of an object can now be defined as a relation between these two 
frames. This relation is specified based on three parameters: 
1) Axis correspondence: the correspondence between the object axes and 
the axes of the external reference frame, 
2) Polarity correspondence: the relation between the polarity of the object 
axes and the polarity of the axes of the external reference frame, and 
3) Tilt:  the object’s tilt relative to the axes of the external reference frame. 
Axis correspondence defines which axes of the object correspond to each 
external axis in the representation. In a two-dimensional object, there are two 
possible mappings: the principal axis of elongation can be represented in 
relation to the external vertical axis (a principal-vertical/secondary-horizontal 
mapping, PVSH) or, alternatively, in relation to the external horizontal axis (a 
principal-horizontal/secondary-vertical mapping, PHSV). 
In the example in Figure 12, the principal axis of the object-based frame is 
mapped onto the external frame’s vertical axis, and the secondary object axis 
onto the external frame’s horizontal axis. 
Polarity correspondence defines how the polarity of each object axis is 
related to the polarity of the axes of the external reference frame—in essence, 
whether or not they correspond. A positive polarity mapping refers to a relation 
in which the object’s axis polarity value (e.g., positive) corresponds to that of the 
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external axis polarity value (e.g., positive). In contrast, a negative polarity 
mapping refers to a relation in which the object’s axis polarity value (e.g., 
positive) does not correspond to that of the external axis (e.g., negative). 
 
Figure 12. A principal-vertical/secondary-horizontal mapping. The object’s principal axis is 
mapped onto the vertical axis of an external reference frame, and the object’s secondary axis 
onto the horizontal axis of the external frame. In this example, both polarity mappings are 
positive (i.e., the polarity values of the object axes correspond to those of the external axes. The 
object’s tilt is represented in relation to the vertical external axis; the object-based frame does 
not carry information about the object’s orientation in space. The line-drawing of the pitcher is 
adapted from Snodgrass & Vanderwart (1980). 
 
The tilt component designates the tilt of the object’s axes in relation to the 
corresponding external axes. It is assumed that tilt direction and tilt magnitude 
are represented independently, by dictating both the direction and magnitude of 
the angular displacement between the object’s principal axis and the 
corresponding external axis. 
For example, the orientation representation of a tilted pitcher (see Fig. 12) 
would look something like this. In this example, the open end of the pitcher (the 
“top”) along the primary axis of elongation in the object-based representation is 
assigned a positive value (+) and the closed end (the “bottom”) a negative value 
(-). (In an everyday setting, the open end would typically be upwards and the 
closed end down, as when placed normally on a table, which is why they are 
referred to as the “top” and the “bottom”. However, the object-based 
representation would not carry any of this information; this level of 
representation is only concerned with the configuration of the object’s parts 
within the object.) Let us assume a vertical external reference frame with one 
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end assigned a positive value (+) (e.g., with respect to the force of gravity) and 
the other end a negative value (-). In the example shown in Figure 12, the 
principal axis of elongation of the pitcher is mapped onto the vertical external 
frame, and the polarity correspondence is positive: the positive pole of the 
object’s primary axis is mapped onto the positive pole of the external vertical 
axis.  
In this example, the secondary axis of elongation in the object-based 
representation is defined such that the end with the lip of the pitcher is assigned 
a positive value (+), and the end with the handle is assigned a negative value (-). 
As shown in Figure 12, the secondary axis is mapped to the horizontal axis of the 
external frame, and the polarity correspondence is positive. The pitcher is also 
slightly tilted clockwise with respect to the external frame’s vertical axis. 
Arbitrarily designating clockwise as the positive direction, the tilt component of 
the representation could be referred to as something like TILT DIRECTION +, 
and TILT MAGNITUDE 45°. 
Taking all the previous parameters into consideration, the whole orientation 
representation for the pitcher would look something like this: 
 
AXIS CORRESPONDENCE: PVSH 
 
POLARITY CORRESPONDENCE 
 PRINCIPAL: + 
 SECONDARY: + 
 
TILT 
 DIRECTION: + 
 MAGNITUDE: 45° 
 
After this relation between an object-centered reference frame and an 
external frame has been established, this (new) representation can then be used 
for action. However, using the representation will typically (or perhaps always) 
involve relating the original reference frame to a new external frame. For 
example, drawing a perceived object involves relating the external stimulus 
frame to a frame relevant for the response, such as a frame defined by the sheet 
of paper on which one draws the picture of the object. The assumption is that 
exactly as in the first relation between the object-centered frame and the 
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external frame, the same relations—axis correspondences, polarity 
correspondences and tilt—will now have to be specified again, this time between 
the first external (e.g., gravity-defined) frame and the second external frame 
(e.g., the stimulus sheet). The assumption is that processing of spatial 
information often involves a progression through several different reference 
frames. 
Given these assumptions, orientation errors in spatial processing could arise 
from failures in the construction or use of any of the representations relating 
reference frames to each other, or in the construction or use of any of the 
representation components. 
2.5.3. Orientation errors and the COR hypothesis 
The COR hypothesis predicts different types of errors depending on which 
component or processing level is misrepresented. These can be illustrated using 
the examples in Figures 10 and 11. 
As discussed earlier, misrepresentations of tilt direction and tilt magnitude 
should result in the kinds of errors shown in Figures 10B and 10C, respectively. 
In contrast, polarity correspondence errors lead to different types of errors. A 
polarity correspondence error relating an object-based frame’s secondary axis to 
an external frame’s horizontal axis should result in an object-axis (left-right) 
reflection (Fig. 11B). Such errors differ from reflections across the object’s 
secondary axis (Fig. 11C), which result from a polarity correspondence error in 
relating the object’s principal axis to the vertical axis of an external frame. A still 
third kind of reflection error is a reflection of the whole figure across an external 
vertical axis through three-dimensional space, resulting from a polarity 
correspondence error between the horizontal axes of two external reference 
frames (Fig. 11D). Fourth, a polarity correspondence error in relating the 
vertical axes of two external frames should result in a reflection of the whole 
stimulus figure across an external horizontal axis (Fig. 11E). 
Using this framework, the performance of BC and other patients with 
cognitive deficits can be interpreted in tasks that involve the processing of 
spatial orientation. 
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2.5.3.1. Interpreting BC’s and other patients’ performance 
As noted before, patient BC’s performance suggested that her responses 
involved both inaccuracy and left-right reflections. Within the COR framework, 
it can be assumed that BC represented the tilt of the object’s principal axis 
relative to a vertical external axis, and that she very frequently misrepresented 
tilt direction. 
The left-right reflection errors can be interpreted as a deficit in representing 
the direction of tilt in relating object and external reference frames. The few up-
down reflections BC may have made for target orientations near to the 
horizontal can be interpreted by assuming that she represented these 
orientations relative to an external horizontal axis. When tilt is specified relative 
to an external horizontal axis, a misrepresentation of tilt direction should not 
lead to left-right but to up-down reflections. (However, it is not clear whether 
BC made true up-down reflection errors, or whether these responses could be 
explained by imprecision alone; for details, see Studies I and II). 
Alternatively, it is also possible that BC’s reflection errors could have arisen 
from polarity correspondence errors in relating two external reference frames to 
each other. A deficit in representing polarity correspondence between two 
external frames should result in a mirror-reflection of the whole object across 
an external axis through three-dimensional space (Figures 11D and 11E). In 
contrast, a tilt-direction error should result in a rotation of the object in the 
picture plane (see Fig. 10B). However, to distinguish between these possibilities, 
one would need empirical data with stimuli that are not bilaterally symmetrical 
about the principal object axis, as both classes of error look identical with 
simple line stimuli. Unfortunately, tasks with stimuli that involved any degree of 
complexity resulted in BC’s performance breaking down completely.  
A key point, however, is that the COR hypothesis makes such distinctions 
explicit. With participants from whom such empirical data can be collected, the 
proposed framework helps in distinguishing between different error types and 
interpreting them. For example, the performance of patient AH can be 
interpreted as resulting from a deficit in representing polarity correspondences 
between object and external reference frame axes, especially in relating a 
secondary object axis to an external reference frame axis (see Figure 13). In 
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direct copying tasks, AH frequently made orientation errors in which a whole 
object was left-right reflected (McCloskey, 2009)5. Within the COR framework, 
such errors can be interpreted as polarity correspondence errors. These errors 
could arise either from erroneous mapping between the object-centered 
representation and an external frame, or from erroneous mapping from one 
external reference frame to another. 
 
Figure 13. A representation in which all axes have been assigned polarities, but polarity 
correspondence is not specified between the object’s secondary axis and an external reference 
frame’s horizontal axis. The line-drawing of the pitcher is adapted from Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart (1980). 
 
Differentiating between object-to-external versus external-to-external 
polarity correspondence errors is not always possible because, as noted before, 
both confusions lead to identical errors with stimuli that are not tilted. 
However, McCloskey and colleagues also tested AH with tilted stimuli, thus, 
providing a basis for further differentiating between such errors. For example, 
in direct copying tasks, AH frequently reflected the stimulus across its principal 
axis of elongation (see Study II). Such errors provide important empirical 
evidence for object-based representations (for a further discussion of this issue, 
see McCloskey, 2009). Within the COR framework, these errors can be 
interpreted as a deficit in representing polarity correspondence between the 
secondary axis of the object-centered frame and an external reference frame. 
(For a more detailed discussion of all orientation error types in AH’s 
        
5 Although such deficits clearly are rare, an extremely similar case has been reported in the 
literature. Pflugshaupt and colleagues (2007) recently identified a patient, PR, whose 
orientation deficit is strikingly similar to AH’s. 
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performance and evidence from other patients with developmental deficits, see 
Study II and McCloskey, 2009). 
Analogously to the above errors in brain-damaged patients, mirror-reflection 
confusions have also been demonstrated in typically developing children and 
under specific conditions, also in neurologically normal human adults. As noted 
before, Gregory and McCloskey (2010) found that the reflection errors adults 
made were primarily reflections across an object axis, while young children 
made both object-axis and external-axis reflections (Gregory et al., 2011). 
According to the COR hypothesis, the object-principal-axis errors observed in 
both adults and children can be interpreted as a failure to represent polarity 
correspondences between object secondary axes and external axes. The external 
vertical axis errors, observed in children but not in adults, can be interpreted 
according to Gregory et al. (2011) as a difficulty in the process of assigning 
polarity representations consistently to the poles of external horizontal axes. 
Presumably, the children’s representations of left and right could be less well-
differentiated than adults’ representations, which could cause the children to 
assign polarity representations inconsistently to external horizontal extrinsic 
axes, giving rise to extrinsic vertical-axis reflection errors. 
Finally, in interpreting BC’s performance, the results showed that in addition 
to the left-right (and possibly some up-down) reflections, her responses were 
clearly also very imprecise. The imprecision in BC’s responses can be 
interpreted by assuming that her representations of tilt magnitude are noisier or 
much more imprecise than those of neurologically intact subjects. Interestingly, 
prior research indicates that such a deficit is also neurophysiologically plausible. 
Damage to the inferotemporal cortex can cause a deficit in monkeys resulting in 
imprecise orientation discrimination. Holmes and Gross (1984; Walsh & Butler, 
1996) found that macaque monkeys with IT cortex lesions were able to 
discriminate normally between stimuli that were rotated 60° or 120°, but failed 
to discern smaller orientation differences of 30° or 45°. Although the degree of 
imprecision is not identical, these results demonstrate that brain damage can, in 
some cases, lead to imprecision in orientation discrimination tasks. 
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2.6. General discussion 
In Part One of this dissertation, orientation representation was investigated in 
an individual with cognitive impairments in orientation processing, patient BC 
(Studies I-II). A theoretical framework was proposed for discussing reflection 
errors and the representation of object orientation, the Coordinate-system 
Orientation Representation (COR) hypothesis, and it was demonstrated that 
this coordinate system could be used to discuss and to interpret orientation 
errors made by patient BC and other patients with deficits in orientation 
processing (Study II), as well as also by neurologically intact adults and typically 
developing children (Gregory & McCloskey, 2010; Gregory et al., 2011). 
Orientation representation has previously been discussed in the literature in 
terms of reference frames and relations between such frames (e.g., Braine, 1978; 
Davidoff & Warrington, 2001; Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006; Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 1988; Riddoch et al., 2004; Turnbull & McCarthy, 1996). Some 
authors have explicitly argued that orientation judgments require the ability to 
represent the object and its axes in relation to an external coordinate frame such 
as one’s body (Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006; Priftis et al., 2003; Riddoch et al., 
2004). Others have suggested, in a similar fashion, that the recognition of object 
orientation would seem to depend on a process aligning an object-centered 
representation with an object-external representation, such as one related to the 
eyes (Harris et al., 2001). While these suggestions are consistent with the COR 
hypothesis, none of these prior suggestions have, however, been developed into 
explicit hypotheses of how orientation is represented at a cognitive level, and 
what the underlying assumptions are about the cognitive processes that relate 
such object- and external frames with each other. The COR hypothesis is an 
attempt to explicate the parameters that an orientation representation needs to 
define, and to provide a theoretical framework within which orientation errors 
can be classified and interpreted. 
For example, prior studies (Turnbull, Driver, & McCarthy, 2004) have shown 
that the ability to judge orientation differences in the picture plane (2D 
rotations) can be dissociated from the ability to discriminate between them in 
the depth plane (3D rotations). The COR hypothesis provides an explicit 
framework for interpreting such dissociations. Further, other studies have 
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shown that knowledge about some orientations—most notably, the upright—can 
be preserved when the ability to judge other orientations has been lost after 
brain damage (Harris et al., 2001; Karnath et al., 2000; Turnbull et al., 1995; 
Turnbull et al., 1997). With the COR hypothesis, results from these and other 
various studies can be discussed and interpreted using the same theoretical 
framework. In fact, recent work has begun to apply the COR hypothesis to 
investigating how the canonical orientation (uprightness) of stimuli is 
represented and how it affects the processing of spatial information (Hatfield, 
Gregory, & McCloskey, 2015). 
The COR hypothesis may also help explain previous findings. For example, 
Harris et al. (2001) studied patient EL, who was impaired in judging many 
orientations of objects rotated in the picture plane, but performed remarkably 
well with objects that were upright. According to the COR hypothesis, the 
processing of orientation information begins with defining axis 
correspondences and polarity correspondences between axes. EL’s performance 
can be interpreted by assuming a locus of deficit in representing tilt (either tilt 
magnitude or both direction and magnitude), with a preserved ability to 
represent axis and polarity correspondences. EL was not tested using mirror-
reflected stimuli, but from the viewpoint of the COR hypothesis, this would be 
an interesting possibility to follow (see also Hatfield et al., 2015).  
Similarly, Turnbull and McCarthy’s (1996) patient RJ could not tell an image 
from its left-right mirror image but was able to differentiate between upright 
and upside-down images. In COR, this pattern of performance can be 
interpreted by assuming that the patient was able to represent the object’s 
principal axis in relation to an extrinsic vertical axis, but that the representation 
failed to specify the polarity correspondence between the object’s secondary axis 
and an extrinsic horizontal axis (see Fig. 13). Such a representation would 
enable one to differentiate between upright and inverted objects, but not to 
distinguish between left-right enantiomorphs. 
As the COR hypothesis is in many ways to be considered a preliminary 
suggestion, several avenues for future research suggest themselves. For 
example, prospects for research could include empirically investigating how 
external reference frames are defined. Empirical evidence so far does not clearly 
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indicate whether external axes are defined according to, for example, the force 
of gravity, the viewer’s head and/or body, or, perhaps under special 
circumstances, the walls of a room. Similarly, the neural mechanisms that 
support the representation of external reference frames—however they are 
defined—are a promising direction for further investigation. For example, the 
lateral intraparietal (LIP) area is known to be important for updating spatial 
information from the eyes and for supporting retinally defined representations 
relative to the viewer (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1992). In the close vicinity, 
in the lateral anterior intraparietal sulcus, neurons have been identified that are 
sensitive to the orientation of three-dimensional objects (Sakata et al., 1998), 
which may be related to how the parietal cortex supports the ability to guide 
hand actions targeted at objects in space. Despite these and other interesting 
findings, however, the neural basis for how different external frames are 
defined, chosen and used in relation to objects is not understood. Further 
research will hopefully elucidate these mechanisms in more detail. 
More generally, many questions related to the neural mechanisms that 
support orientation representations of whole objects are still open and lend 
themselves to further study. Many interesting findings related to the neural 
basis of orientation processing have been reported (e.g., Ferster & Miller, 2000; 
Ferster, 2003; Furmanski & Engel, 2000; Gaffan, Harrison, & Gaffan, 1986; 
Gross et al., 1972; Holmes & Gross, 1984; Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1968; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011; Ling, Pearson, & Blake, 
2009; Rollenhagen & Olson, 2000; Somers et al., 1995; Ungerleider & 
Pasternak, 2003; van der Zwan, Leo, Joung, Latimer, & Wenderoth, 1998; 
Vogels & Orban, 1994). The neural basis of orientation processing has been 
investigated in brain-damaged patients (e.g., Harris et al., 2001; Karnath et al., 
2000; Martinaud et al., 2016; Riddoch et al., 2004), animal models (Walsh & 
Butler, 1996), and in neuroimaging work with normal adults (Faillenot, Sunaert, 
Van Hecke, & Orban, 2001; Shikata et al., 2003). Despite these and many other 
important studies, neither the neural mechanisms that support orientation 
representations of whole objects, nor the dynamics that give rise to the different 
orientation error types are yet fully understood. For example, the parietal 
cortices are often implicated in discussions of orientation processing, as many 
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patients with orientation deficits have sustained damage to the parietal areas 
(Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006; Martinaud et al., 2016; Walsh, 1996, but this is 
not the case with all patients (e.g., McCloskey, 2009; Pflugshaupt et al., 2007). 
Integrating the findings across different studies has proven challenging.  
One goal of the present discussion has been to show that the processing of 
orientation may employ several kinds of representations comprising several 
different subcomponents. These may in turn depend on different neural 
substrates. Previous studies have often been conducted using heterogeneous 
materials that are often inadequate for distinguishing among all possible error 
types. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn across studies, and may 
partly explain why integrating the different findings from previous studies has 
been difficult. For example, if a tilt-direction-component deficit might arise 
from a particular kind of injury that can be anatomically localized, would the 
neural locus be different for a tilt-magnitude deficit, or for deficits resulting in 
object-principal-axis or object-secondary-axis reflections? To tease apart these 
components, one needs to use stimuli that do not conflate the different error 
types. Hopefully, an explicit cognitive-level theoretical framework such as the 
COR hypothesis could provide a cursory map for informing such research in the 
future, both in imaging and behavioral work with intact adults and with 
individuals with cognitive deficits.  
Promisingly, recent neuroimaging work has begun to apply the COR 
hypothesis in exactly this manner to investigate the neural representation of 
object orientation. Hatfield et al.’s (2014; under review) results suggest that 
object-axis reflections may elicit more similar patterns of neural responding 
than external-axis reflections in object-selective areas in the lateral occipital 
complex, consistent with how object-axis reflections are more easily confusable 
behaviorally. Also consistently with the COR hypothesis, a recent study of 
patients with parietal damage suggests that the abilities to differentiate mirror-
reflected and rotated stimuli are both cognitively distinct and supported by (at 
least partly) separate neural processes (Martinaud et al., 2016). 
Finally, still another possibility for future research, not specifically conjoined 
to the COR hypothesis, is related to symmetry perception. The human visual 
system is particularly sensitive to bilateral visual symmetries, and some 
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phenomena related to orientation processing might be pertinent for how 
symmetries are detected. For example, the orientations of local element pairs 
affect how global symmetries are perceived (Saarinen & Levi, 1995). In addition, 
some visual properties of symmetry axes seem to be processed similarly as those 
of line orientations, and some authors have suggested that both orientation and 
symmetry encoding might be neurally supported by similar mechanisms 
(Treder, 2010; van der Zwan et al., 1998). Like mirror images, visual 
symmetries are also detected across external or object axes, and the percept of 
symmetry with respect to the vertical seems to emerge especially quickly and 
effortlessly under a wide range of conditions (Herbert & Humphrey, 1996; 
Treder, 2010). The detection of bilateral symmetry may be involved in how 
visual input is organized and segregated into figure and ground (Driver, Baylis, 
& Rafal, 1992). An interesting suggestion is that biological preferences for 
symmetric patterns in animals might have evolved to facilitate object 
recognition from different orientations (Enquist & Arak, 1994). If symmetry 
detection plays such an important role in primate vision, perhaps possible 
connections between symmetry perception and orientation representation 
might also be useful to investigate further. 
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3. Part Two: The Neural Basis for the Acquisition of 
New Memory Representations 
Like vision, human memory relies on cognitive representations constructed of 
objects and events in the outside world. What are the brain mechanisms that 
enable us to acquire new memory representations? For example, how does the 
brain support our ability to learn to perform new tasks? How do different 
processing modules in the brain work in concert to support the acquisition of 
new memories for facts and events? 
Part Two of this dissertation is concerned with these questions. In particular, 
Part Two aims to investigate how structures outside the medial temporal lobes 
(MTL) in the brain contribute to learning when new memory representations 
are acquired.  
The different brain structures that support the acquisition of new memories 
are typically investigated in isolation from each other, which is often a fruitful 
approach. However, rapidly mounting evidence indicates that in learning, many 
different brain mechanisms localized in various brain regions act in concert to 
support learning in an adaptable and versatile manner (Barredo, Oztekin, & 
Badre, 2015; Buckner & Wheeler, 2001; Henke, 2010; Nadel & Peterson, 2013; 
Poldrack et al., 2001; Reber, 2013; Simons & Spiers, 2003; Squire & Wixted, 
2011). Thus, it is sometimes beneficial to examine cognitive processes and their 
neural basis in the context of the cognitive modules and brain mechanisms with 
which they normally interact. In fact, Shohamy and Turk-Browne (2013) 
suggest that “the most fertile ground for discovery in cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience lies at the interface between parts of the mind and brain that have 
traditionally been studied in isolation”. 
Therefore, in order not to restrict the focus of study to an isolated mechanism 
alone, Part Two aimed both to shed light on the brain mechanisms that support 
learning, and to examine how MTL- and non-MTL-based brain mechanisms 
interact during the acquisition of new memory representations. Part Two 
employed both behavioral experiments and magnetic recordings of brain 
activity to collect empirical evidence through different but complementary 
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methods. The brain dynamics of interest were studied both in a brain-damaged 
amnesic individual and also in neurologically healthy participants. 
3.1. The medial temporal lobe, the hippocampus and human 
memory 
Since Scoville and Milner’s (1957) landmark study of patient HM, the medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) has been known to be critical for the acquisition of new 
long-term memories. In an attempt to alleviate HM’s difficult epilepsy, sections 
of his MTL areas were surgically removed. After the resection, HM developed a 
severe deficit in the ability to form new declarative memories, memories that 
can be intentionally retrieved (Corkin, 2002; Eichenbaum, 2013; Scoville & 
Milner, 1957; Squire, 2009). The link between the MTL and memory function 
has later been corroborated in studies with other amnesic patients, such as RB, 
GD and EP (Insausti, Annese, Amaral, & Squire, 2013; Preston & Wagner, 2007; 
Squire & Knowlton, 2000; Stefanacci, Buffalo, Schmolck, & Squire, 2000; Zola-
Morgan, Squire, & Amaral, 1986) and in experimental work with rodents and 
monkeys (Eichenbaum, 2000; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire & Knowlton, 
2000; Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004; Squire & Wixted, 2011; Suzuki & Amaral, 
2004). 
A structure of particular importance for declarative memory within the MTL 
is the hippocampus. The hippocampal region6 consists of the subicular complex, 
the CA fields and the dentate gyrus. The hippocampus lies at the top of a 
processing hierarchy, receiving projections from the entorhinal cortex, which in 
turn receives its input from the perirhinal cortex, the parahippocampal cortex 
and other direct projections (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire et al., 2004; 
Suzuki & Amaral, 2004). Through the perirhinal, parahippocampal and 
entorhinal cortices, the hippocampus is wired to receive neural input from all 
parts of the neocortex, and it is thought to integrate information from all 
sensory modalities (Moscovitch, Nadel, Winocur, Gilboa, & Rosenbaum, 2006; 
Squire & Knowlton, 2000; Suzuki & Amaral, 2004). 
The hippocampus, together with other MTL structures (and the 
diencephalon), is thought to comprise the neural basis for declarative learning 
                                                
6 The hippocampal region is not to be confused with the hippocampal formation, which 
refers to the hippocampal region together with the entorhinal cortex. 
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(for reviews, see Eichenbaum, 2000; Gabrieli, 1998; Preston & Wagner, 2007; 
Squire & Knowlton, 2000; Squire et al., 2004; Squire & Wixted, 2011). While 
the functions of the hippocampus are complex and their optimal 
conceptualization still under debate (Henke, 2010; Moscovitch et al., 2006; 
Nadel & Peterson, 2013; Shohamy & Turk-Browne, 2013; Verfaellie, LaRocque, 
& Keane, 2012), a large body of evidence from both human amnesic patients 
and non-human animals shows that the hippocampus is critical for the 
formation of new declarative memories (Eichenbaum, 2000; Mishkin, 1978; 
Rempel-Clower, Zola, Squire, & Amaral, 1996; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; 
Zola-Morgan, Squire, & Ramus, 1994). Already in HM’s case, Scoville and 
Milner (1957) regarded the lost hippocampal tissue as the prime suspect for 
causing his amnesia, as the removed MTL areas included large parts of the 
hippocampus. Although HM was the first well-documented patient study to 
suggest an important role for the hippocampus in supporting long-term 
memory, this conclusion was not warranted on HM’s performance alone. HM’s 
lesion included not only parts of the hippocampus, but also the amygdala and 
the adjacent parahippocampal areas (Corkin, 2002), leaving the relative 
contributions of the different structures unclear. The first thoroughly 
documented neuropsychological study demonstrating the critical role of the 
hippocampus in humans was Zola-Morgan and colleagues’ (1986) investigation 
of patient RB, who developed moderately severe anterograde amnesia following 
an ischemic episode. RB’s MTL damage was localized to the CA1 subfield of the 
hippocampus, demonstrating that a lesion limited to the hippocampus alone (or 
only one of its subfields) is enough to impair memory function. These results 
were later corroborated in other patient studies (Rempel-Clower et al., 1996). 
The hippocampus has traditionally been held to be critical for both semantic 
memory, the ability to learn new factual knowledge about the world, and 
episodic memory, the ability to acquire new memories about life events (Squire 
& Knowlton, 2000; Squire et al., 2004; Squire & Wixted, 2011). However, 
Henke (2010) has argued that this may not be the optimal way to conceptualize 
memory processes in relation to hippocampal involvement. Instead, Henke 
proposes that several other factors, such as flexibility of retrieval and the 
number of trials needed for learning are more essential. While both semantic 
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and episodic memory acquisition are profoundly disrupted by hippocampal 
damage, evidence also shows that some learning of new semantic memories is 
possible even when the hippocampus is damaged, albeit very slowly over 
numerous repetitions (Hamann & Squire, 1995; Holdstock, Mayes, Isaac, Gong, 
& Roberts, 2002; Kitchener, Hodges, & McCarthy, 1998; O'Kane, Kensinger, & 
Corkin, 2004; Tulving, Hayman, & Macdonald, 1991). According to Henke 
(2010), the hippocampus is critical for the rapid encoding of associations that 
can be flexibly retrieved cued by different contextual demands. 
In addition to the hippocampus, the entorhinal, perirhinal and 
parahippocampal cortices also contribute to declarative memory. Larger MTL 
lesions result generally in more severe memory impairments than if the damage 
is restricted to fewer structures (Corkin, 2002; Gabrieli, 1998; Rempel-Clower 
et al., 1996; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire et al., 2004; Squire & Wixted, 
2011). For example, HM’s lesion extended to the parahippocampal gyrus. 
Consistent with the notion that non-hippocampal MTL areas are also important 
for memory function, his memory impairment was markedly more severe than 
RB’s, whose MTL damage was limited to the CA1 subfield only.  
3.2. Memory function supported by non-MTL-structures 
All memory functions are not equally affected by MTL damage. For example, 
HM did not lose his ability for all learning after his MTL resection. Despite his 
severe deficits in tasks such as memorizing word lists, his performance showed 
gradual improvement after repeated trials in various other tasks such as mirror 
drawing, in which he was asked to trace the outline of a figure through a mirror 
without being able to see his hand (Corkin, 1968; 2002; Milner, 1962). In 
addition to simple motor tasks such as mirror drawing and rotary pursuit, HM 
and other amnesic patients have also shown improvement after repeated trials 
in perceptual priming tasks, classical conditioning, and habituation experiments 
(Corkin, 1968; 2002; Eichenbaum, 2000; Milner, 1962; Squire & Knowlton, 
2000; Stefanacci et al., 2000), corroborating that MTL damage does not impair 
learning completely in all tasks. 
The learning observed in various tasks with MTL-damaged patients is 
probably not supported by a single unified neural mechanism, however, but 
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instead by several different ones. As Reber (2013) points out, it has proven 
extremely difficult to determine what different non-MTL-supported learning 
tasks have in common. Typically, non-MTL-supported learning processes are 
investigated in settings that do not require voluntary retrieval7 of the learned 
material and in which learning is expressed implicitly through performance. 
Other common denominators have been difficult to find. Thus, these “other” 
types of learning are often collectively referred to as non-declarative learning—
an umbrella term referring to several different non-MTL-based memory 
systems.  
Different authors have suggested several candidates for brain mechanisms 
that could support non-declarative learning in various tasks. For example, 
evidence suggests that the neostriatum—the caudate nucleus and the putamen—
and the cerebellum can support at least some forms of learning required in 
simple motor tasks (Eichenbaum, 2000; Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; 
Woodruff-Pak, Papka, & Ivry, 1996). The cerebellum is also considered 
important for certain forms of conditioning that do not depend on the 
MTL/hippocampal memory system (Weiss & Disterhoft, 2015). For perceptual 
priming effects, in contrast, neocortical regions have been implicated (Cave & 
Squire, 1992; Schacter & Buckner, 1998; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). More 
generally, a widely entertained notion is that multiple regions of the neocortex 
participate in memory function by maintaining a distributed neural record of 
the initial sensory experiences that can be reactivated later (Buckner & Wheeler, 
2001; Danker & Anderson, 2010). As an example of such a reactivation-based 
memory system, the primary sensory cortices, such as primary auditory cortex, 
seem capable of housing at least some forms of non-MTL-based memory 
representations related to sensory processing (Grosso, Cambiaghi, Concina, 
Sacco, & Sacchetti, 2015; Polley, Steinberg, & Merzenich, 2006; Weinberger, 
2007a; Weinberger, 2007b).  
Importantly, evidence indicates that the brain mechanisms that support 
declarative and non-declarative memory interact depending on task demands. 
Poldrack et al. (2001) used functional MRI to show that with an identical set of 
                                                
7 Complicating the issue further, see Henke (2010) for a convincing argument that voluntary 
retrieval many not be the best basis for classifying memory processes. 
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stimuli, the relative engagement of the MTL and the basal ganglia changed 
depending on whether declarative or non-declarative aspects of the cognitive 
task were emphasized, respectively. According to the authors, this suggests that 
structures in these brain regions compete during the acquisition of new 
memories, and that this competition is dependent on task demands. Complex 
interactions between declarative and non-declarative memory systems have also 
been reported in the context of relatively simple forms of learning such as 
conditioning (Weiss & Disterhoft, 2015). Thus, although distinct and dissociable 
memory systems such as those supporting declarative and non-declarative 
memory do exist in the brain, they do not operate in isolation from each other, 
but in a dynamic and interdependent fashion. 
3.3. Aims of Part Two 
In sum, prior research has established that the MTL/hippocampal memory 
system is crucial for the rapid acquisition of new declarative memories, and that 
damage to the MTL area, or even to the hippocampus alone, can impair the 
ability to form new declarative memories. In contrast, many types of non-
declarative learning are not equally dependent on the integrity of the 
MTL/hippocampal system. 
While the MTL/hippocampal memory system has been studied in 
considerable detail, many questions remain concerning the non-MTL- and non-
hippocampally supported memory systems. For example, non-MTL-based 
learning mechanisms have typically been investigated using tasks that are 
relatively (or extremely) simple. Thus, it is unclear whether non-MTL- and non-
hippocampally-based learning mechanisms can support learning in tasks that 
are cognitively complex.  
Another question that has not been fully investigated concerns how the 
MTL/hippocampal system interacts with other brain systems to support 
learning. For example, prior research has shown that brain structures dedicated 
to sensory processing participate in memory function, at least to some extent 
(Buckner & Wheeler, 2001; Danker & Anderson, 2010; Polley et al., 2006), and 
that the hippocampus and the MTL also contribute to sensory processing 
(Barense, Ngo, Hung, & Peterson, 2012; Nadel & Peterson, 2013). How do 
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sensory processing modules interact with the MTL/hippocampal system when 
new memories are acquired? This potential interaction has currently not been 
investigated in detail. 
The general aim of Part Two of this dissertation was to use empirical data 
collected using complementary methods to explore some of the brain 
mechanisms outside the MTL/hippocampal system that support the acquisition 
of new memories.  
The specific aims of Part Two were: 
• to use behavioral data from a brain-damaged individual to investigate 
whether non-hippocampal structures alone can support the 
acquisition of new memory representations in music performance, a 
cognitively complex context that requires motor control (Study III) 
• to use recordings of brain activity from neurologically intact adults to 
investigate whether the process of new declarative-memory 
acquisition affects the neural processing of irrelevant sensory 
information in a non-MTL region⎯human auditory cortex (Study IV) 
3.4. Study III 
3.4.1. Can non-hippocampal structures support complex learning? 
As outlined earlier, simple motor tasks can be learned through rote repetition 
despite hippocampal damage. However, an unresolved question is whether new 
learning is possible without the hippocampus in a cognitively complex context 
that requires motor control. The cognitive complexity of the learning process 
itself seems to critically affect whether the MTL and the hippocampus are 
involved. That is, the more processing modules the learning requires, the more 
likely the learning is to engage the hippocampus (Henke, 2010). Potentially, this 
might mean that new learning that requires motor control might not be possible 
after hippocampal damage if the learning context is complex. 
A prime example of a complex task that requires precise motor control is 
music performance. Playing music has been described as one of the cognitively 
most complex forms of skilled serial action that human beings can perform 
(Altenmüller & Schneider, 2009; Palmer, 1997). However, music performance 
has been studied considerably less in cognitive neuroscience than music 
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recognition (for reviews of the cognitive neuroscience of music, see Levitin & 
Tirovolas, 2009; Peretz & Zatorre, 2005; Zatorre, Chen, & Penhune, 2007). 
Reasons for this relative imbalance include technical difficulties in 
neuroimaging complex motor behavior and the lack of neuropsychological 
research patients who would present with both suitably focal brain lesions and 
special abilities for music performance. 
Despite the inherent complexity involved in music performance, learning to 
play a new piece of music has sometimes been equated with “procedural”, “non-
declarative” or “motor learning” in the psychological research literature 
(Cavaco, Feinstein, van Twillert, & Tranel, 2012; Cowles et al., 2003; Crystal, 
Grober, & Masur, 1989; Simmons, 2012), implying that new learning for music 
performance would not depend on the hippocampus. These terms, however, 
may not be entirely applicable to complex skills such as music performance. 
Stanley and Krakauer (2013) have recently argued convincingly that what HM 
acquired in simple motor tasks such as mirror drawing was not a motor skill but 
improved motor acuity – only one component of complex motor skills such as 
music performance. Therefore, in contrast to how the results from HM and 
other amnesic patients have often been interpreted, complex skills such as 
music performance are probably not adequately operationalized by motor acuity 
tasks (see Study III introduction, Beatty et al., 1999; Stanley & Krakauer, 2013). 
Consistent with the difference between motor skill and motor acuity, the 
ability to improve one’s performance in simple motor acuity tasks does not 
guarantee the capability to learn to play new music (Beatty et al., 1999), 
suggesting that the hippocampus may be critical for the learning of new music 
for performance. Unlike the repetition of well-rehearsed motions, sight-reading 
novel music requires the execution of novel combinations of motor movements 
in an order one has never encountered before. Unlike the simple motor tasks in 
which HM showed improvement after repetition, sight-reading difficult new 
musical material poses large cognitive demands, including a high short-term 
memory load, because music is played under strict hierarchical time constraints 
(Furneaux & Land, 1999; Kinsler & Carpenter, 1995; Lehmann & Kopiez; 
Palmer, 2006; Sloboda, 1984).  
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Is the learning of new music possible in the absence of the hippocampus? 
Only two previous studies have investigated the learning of new music in 
amnesic patients with hippocampal damage. Modest learning was reported in 
both studies (Cavaco et al., 2012; Cowles et al., 2003). Unfortunately, however, 
both studies left open the possibility that the observed learning was supported 
by remaining hippocampal tissue. In both patients, either some hippocampal 
tissue remained, or the extent of the hippocampal damage was unreported. 
Indirect evidence suggests that both hippocampal and non-hippocampal 
structures normally contribute to learning when new memories are acquired for 
music performance. First, the hippocampus is important for both the learning of 
single items and for the ability to form new associations between unrelated 
items (Eichenbaum, 2000; Henke, Weber, Kneifel, Wieser, & Buck, 1999; 
O'Kane et al., 2004; Schapiro, Gregory, Landau, McCloskey, & Turk-Browne, 
2014; Squire et al., 2004; Stark, Bayley, & Squire, 2002). Second, sight-reading 
novel pieces of music requires the ability to integrate information related to 
pitch, rhythm and meter and sensory information from the visual, auditory and 
tactile modalities. The hippocampus is likely to be recruited especially when the 
context is complex and when task demands require that information is 
integrated from many sources (Henke, 2010; Nadel & Peterson, 2013; Squire & 
Knowlton, 2000). Third, sight-reading music poses high short-term memory 
demands, and tasks that pose high short-term memory demands have been 
shown to recruit the hippocampus (Axmacher et al., 2007; van Vugt, Schulze-
Bonhage, Litt, Brandt, & Kahana, 2010). Fourth, the hippocampus has been 
implicated in memory tasks that involve the learning of novel melodies 
(Watanabe, Yagishita, & Kikyo, 2008), and MTL damage has been shown to 
impair the ability to learn new melodies (Wilson & Saling, 2008). Fifth, 
neuroimaging studies show that the hippocampus is engaged when complex 
temporal sequences are learned during motor performance (Robertson, 2007; 
Schendan, Searl, Melrose, & Stern, 2003). Some authors contend that the 
hippocampus supports the learning of higher-order temporal associations in 
practiced sequences (Albouy et al., 2008; Schendan et al., 2003), suggesting 
that the integrity of the hippocampus may be essential for the learning of new 
music for music performance.  
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In sum, it is currently an open question whether the hippocampus is critical 
for learning to perform a new piece of music, or whether at least some learning 
can be supported by non-hippocampal structures alone. To investigate this, 
Study III examined the learning of novel pieces of viola music through sight-
reading in an amnesic patient whose hippocampus has been bilaterally nearly 
completely obliterated. Study III investigated whether LSJ could show learning 
for new pieces of music after practice despite her extensive anterograde amnesia 
and extensive bilateral MTL damage. 
Unlike the patients in previous studies (Cavaco et al., 2012; Cowles et al., 
2003), LSJ has virtually no intact hippocampal tissue. Therefore, any learning 
potentially observed in her performance cannot be attributed to remaining 
hippocampal tissue. Thus, her rare case of brain damage and selectively spared 
ability to play and sight-read music offer a unique opportunity for investigating 
whether new learning for music performance is possible without the 
hippocampus. Further, unlike in previous studies, novel viola pieces were used 
that were specifically composed to control for factors affecting musical 
complexity. In addition, unlike in previous studies, performance was evaluated 
before and after practice, both immediately and 14 days later, with detailed 
note-by-note analyses and subjective whole-piece performance judgments by a 
group of string instrumentalists. 
3.4.2. Methods 
3.4.2.1. Participants 
LSJ is a newly-identified amnesic patient who has suffered extensive bilateral 
MTL damage, including the near-complete bilateral destruction of the 
hippocampus, after a herpes simplex encephalitis (HSE) infection. Before her 
illness, LSJ was a skilled amateur musician. Her ability to play the viola and to 
sight-read music have been spared after the brain damage. 
Case report. LSJ contracted HSE at age 57; during the time of the study, she 
was 62 years old. Prior to her illness, she was a successful professional 
illustrator and a trained amateur musician. 
Structural MRI revealed extensive bilateral damage to the MTL and anterior 
temporal damage in the left hemisphere (Figure 14). A volumetric analysis of 
the MTL region (Table 4, Schapiro et al., 2014) showed that the hippocampus 
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had been eliminated bilaterally nearly completely: 4% of hippocampal tissue 
remained in the left hemisphere and 0% in the right. 
 
 
Figure 14. Magnetic resonance images of patient LSJ’s brain: axial (Right) and coronal (Left) 
view. 
 
Table 4. Remaining brain volume in patient LSJ by MTL region (Schapiro et al., 2014). 
 
MTL Region Remaining volume relative to age-matched controls (N=4) 
Left (%) Right (%) 
Hippocampus 4 0 
Parahippocampal cortex 12 62 
Entorhinal cortex 0 43 
Perirhinal cortex 2 50 
 
 
In sharp contrast to LSJ’s largely spared intellectual and musical capabilities 
(see Study III for details), LSJ presents with extremely severe anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia. On the Wechsler Memory Scale III, she scored in the 
severely impaired range on all subscales except for working memory, which 
showed milder impairment (for details, see Study III, for full 
neuropsychological profile see Gregory, McCloskey, & Landau, 2014). Thorough 
interviews failed to identify memory for even a single episode of her life prior to 
her illness (Gregory et al., 2014). She did not remember anyone from the 
research group despite meeting the researchers several times for hours at a 
time, and showed no recollection of tasks she had completed only a moment 
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ago. In conversation, she discussed everyday topics enthusiastically and 
expressively but appeared to forget the conversation immediately if her 
attention was drawn elsewhere. 
 
3.4.2.2. Stimuli 
Three new semi-classical pieces of viola music were composed (A, B and C). 
Special care was taken to control for various factors that affect a piece’s 
complexity (e.g., hand position changes, accidentals, clef and key signature 
changes). The factors matched across the three pieces are shown in Tables 5 and 
6. (For details, see Study III.) 
3.4.2.3. Procedure 
LSJ practiced playing two of the pieces (A and B) in two different sessions 
during the same day (see Figure 15). Piece A was practiced in Session 1, and 
Piece B in Session 2. Piece C served as a control and was not practiced. 
 
 
Figure 15. Study design. Two practice sessions were conducted during the same day, in which 
LSJ practiced two pieces on the viola. Piece A was practiced in Session 1, and Piece B in Session 
2. LSJ’s performance on all pieces was evaluated at a tempo of 144 bpm in test trials before and 
after each practice session, and 14 days after practice. Adapted from Study III. 
 
 
During each practice session, LSJ completed 32 practice trials in which she 
played material from the piece on the viola at increasing tempos with a 
metronome. The practice material included both short segments of the piece as 
well as whole-piece performance trials. Each practice session lasted 
approximately an hour. (For details, see Study III.) 
  77
Table 5. Number of notes by duration and clef in Pieces A, B and C. 
 
Note type Piece 
 Piece A Piece B Piece C 
Dotted quarter notes 1 1 1 
Eighth notes 145 145 145 
Half notes 15 15 15 
Quarter notes 80 78 80 
Quarter triplets 6 6 6 
Whole notes 1 1 1 
Total 248 247 248 
Quarter notes in treble clef 8 8 8 
Half notes in treble clef 4 4 4 
Eighth notes in treble clef 16 16 16 
Total number of notes in treble clef 28 28 28 
Total number of notes in alto clef 220 219 220 
Total 248 247 248 
 
 
 
Table 6. Type and number of other musical events matched across Pieces A, B and C. 
 
Musical event  Piece 
 Piece A Piece B Piece C 
Quarter-note double-stops 4 4 4 
Half-note double-stops 6 6 6 
Eighth-note double-stops 2 2 2 
A# accidentals 1 1 1 
D# accidentals 3 3 3 
Bb accidentals 2 2 2 
Quarter-note slurs 6 6 6 
Eighth-note slurs 52 52 52 
Harmonics 2 1 1 
Notes played with 4th finger 6 6 5 
String crossings 119 119 119 
Hand position shifts 4 4 4 
Notes played in third position 24 24 21 
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Test trials, in which LSJ played all three pieces in their entirety at a tempo of 
144 beats per minute (bpm), were administered immediately before and after 
each practice session and again after a 14-day delay period. 
In all practice and test trials, LSJ was presented with the sheet music and 
instructed to play it to the best of her ability, without interruption, and 
according to the metronome. 
Not even once did LSJ show any recollection of ever having encountered the 
same sheet music before when she was presented with any of the pieces or 
segments of them. 
3.4.2.4. Note-by-note analyses 
LSJ’s performance in test trials was evaluated with two methods: note-by-note 
analyses and subjective performance ratings by experienced string players 
(violinists and violists). 
In note-by-note analyses, two independent coders scored the number of 
notes LSJ played correctly from audio recordings of intact whole performances. 
Both coders were skilled amateur musicians. The first coder was blind to test 
trial, but not to which pieces had been practiced. The second scorer was blind to 
both test trial and practiced pieces, and was otherwise not involved with the 
study. 
One point was awarded for every note that was played correctly according to 
pitch, relative rhythm, note duration, and the metronome-dictated tempo. Zero 
points were given for notes in which any of these aspects were incorrect. 
When an error occurred that caused all subsequent notes to be misaligned 
(e.g., a skipped or an extraneous note), coders indentified the next first run of 
four consecutive notes that were played correctly to avoid penalizing all 
subsequent notes after a single error. This four-note run was used to establish a 
new meter with respect to the metronome, and coding was resumed from (and 
including) this four-note string.  
The performances were scored in three blocks, with all test trials in one block 
per piece. The order of the blocks and the order of test trials within a block were 
separately randomized for each of the two coders.  
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Mean inter-rater reliability was 0.88 (0.87, 0.86, and 0.90 for Pieces A, B, 
and C, respectively). All discrepancies in coding were resolved between the 
coders, and the resolved scorings were used for analyses. 
3.4.2.5. Subjective whole-piece performance ratings 
Six experienced string instrument players (4 violists and 2 violinists) were asked 
to evaluate all LSJ’s test trial performances from audio recordings. All raters 
were professional musicians or music students (mean number of years played 
13.7; range 9-22). All raters were blind to both test trial and to which pieces had 
been practiced. 
The string players evaluated the test trial performances on a scale of 1-5 
according to three qualitative dimensions of musical performance chosen based 
on prior research (Zdzinski & Barnes, 2002): intonation, rhythm, and tone. In 
addition, the evaluators were also asked to rate the performances overall.  
The performances were presented to the evaluators in three blocks, all test 
trials of one piece comprising one block. The order of blocks and the order or 
trials within each block were randomized across raters. 
3.4.3. Results 
Learning was expected to result in a positive linear trend, perhaps both overall 
(as all pieces, including the control piece, were performed many times 
throughout the experiment). In addition, it was anticipated that a quadratic 
trend might also occur, reflecting a plateauing of scores from Test Trial 4 to Test 
Trial 5, as no additional training took place over the delay. Most importantly, 
however, more pronounced learning effects were expected for the practiced 
Pieces A and B than for the unpracticed Piece C. 
3.4.3.1. Note-by-note analyses 
All three pieces were challenging for LSJ to sight-read at the dictated tempo. 
The mean percentage of correctly played notes across the three pieces was 29% 
in her first test trials, showing that the complexity of the material clearly 
exceeded her sight-reading capacity at the designated (fast) tempo. 
Qualitatively, all trials included several points of temporal breakdown and 
violations of the underlying beat, demonstrating that she was unable to 
maintain the temporal continuity expected in music performance. 
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To investigate potential learning through practice, we compared three critical 
trials most comparable across the different pieces: Test Trial 1, administered 
before no pieces had been practiced, Test Trial 4, administered on the same day 
after both target pieces had been practiced, and Test Trial 5, administered 14 
days after practice. As potential learning effects were expected similarly in both 
practiced pieces, results were collapsed across Pieces A and B, and compared to 
the unpracticed control piece C. 
As shown in Figure 16, effects of learning can be seen clearly in the critical 
trials. Mean percentages of correct notes increased across pieces from 29% to 
61% in Test Trials 1 and 5, respectively. A repeated-measures ANOVA (2 piece 
types x 3 test trials) showed a significant main effect of piece type (practiced 
versus unpracticed; F(1,246) = 71.23, p < 0.001), a significant main effect of test 
trial (F(2,492) = 111.95, p < 0.001), and importantly, a significant interaction 
(F(2,492) = 19.58, p < 0.001). 
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Figure 16. Mean proportion of correctly played notes in LSJ’s sight-reading performances on 
the viola before practice, after practice on the same day, and after a 14-day delay. Results have 
been collapsed across the two practiced pieces, Piece A and Piece B. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. Adapted from Study III. 
 
For the main effect of test trial, there was a significant linear trend across 
trials (F(1,246) = 161.38, p < 0.001), reflecting an overall improvement in note 
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scores for both piece types from Test Trial 1 to 5. The quadratic trend was also 
significant (F(1,246) = 44.06, p < 0.001), reflecting the increase in note scores 
immediately after practice and followed by a plateauing of scores across the 14-
day delay. 
Critically, the improvement in LSJ’s performance was larger in the practiced 
pieces than in the unpractice piece in both the linear and the quadratic trends, 
F(1,246) = 43.66, p < 0.001 and F(1,246) = 3.95, p < 0.05, respectively. As 
Figure 15 demonstrates, note scores improved after practice for all pieces, but 
this improvement was larger for the practiced pieces. The learning was also 
retained during the 14-day delay: as shown in the figure, the note scores for Test 
Trial 5 stayed almost exactly at the level of the previous trial for both practiced 
and unpracticed pieces, but were higher for practiced pieces. 
The effect of practice is also apparent when the results are examined for 
individual pieces in the different test trials. As shown in Table 7, the piece 
practiced in a given session always showed the largest numerical performance 
improvement after the practice session. (The only exception to this pattern was 
a poor score for Piece A on Test Trial 3: On that particular trial, LSJ 
exceptionally played most of the piece in half tempo either deliberately or by 
accident, providing a zero-score for all the corresponding notes. After this one 
trial, however, her subsequent scores for Piece A were again systematically 
higher than on the first trial.) 
 
 
Table 7. Mean percentages of correctly played notes according to piece and test trial. 
 
Test Trial Piece A 
correct (%) 
Piece B 
correct (%) 
Piece C 
correct (%) 
1: Before Practice 39 21 26 
2: After Practicing A 66 39 45 
3: Before Practicing B 35 34 47 
4: After Practicing B 59 70 41 
5: After 14-Day Delay 76 64 43 
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3.4.3.2. Subjective whole-piece performance ratings 
Effects of targeted practice were also evident in the performance ratings given 
by experienced string instrumentalists. Mean ratings increased across all pieces 
from before to after practice in all four dimensions. As shown in Table 8, the 
numerically most pronounced improvement in all rating dimensions was 
observed after each practice session for the piece that had been practiced, and 
the practiced piece showed better performance also thereafter than the 
unpracticed piece. 
As with note-by-note scores, the results were analysed for the critical three 
test trials most comparable to each other: Test Trials 1, 4, and 5, with the data 
collapsed across the two practiced pieces. Separate repeated-measures ANOVAS 
(2 piece types x 3 test trials) showed a significant main effect of test trial in all 
rating dimensions, showing that performance ratings improved across test 
trials: intonation (F(2,10) = 9.07, p < 0.01), rhythm (F(2,10) = 6.52, p < 0.05), 
tone (F(2,10) = 6.49, p < 0.05), and overall (F(2,10) = 8.72, p < 0.01). The main 
effect of piece type (practiced versus unpracticed) was also significant for 
intonation (F(1,5) = 17.1, p < 0.01), tone (F(1,5) = 7.66, p < 0.05) and overall 
ratings (F(1,5) = 13.35, p < 0.05). 
Critically, practice affected the ratings differently in the practiced pieces 
relative to the unpracticed control piece in ratings of intonation and tone: the 
interaction between piece type and test trial was significant in these dimensions 
(F(2,10) = 6.150, p < 0.05; F(2,10) = 10.181, p < 0.01, respectively). The ratings 
improved for the two practiced pieces after the practice sessions and stayed the 
same or fell slightly after the 14-day delay, while ratings for the control piece 
showed less or no improvement and a marked decline over the delay (F(1,5) = 
9.494, p < 0.05; F(1,5) = 16.304, p < 0.01 for linear trend in practiced versus 
unpracticed pieces for intonation and tone, respectively). The interaction also 
approached significance in overall ratings (F(2,10) = 3.545, p = 0.069), but was 
insignificant in rhythm ratings (F(2,10) = 1.746, p = 0.224). 
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Table 8. Mean performance ratings by string instrumentalists for all evaluated performance 
dimensions according to piece and test trial. 
 
Performance  
dimension 
Test Trial Piece 
A 
Piece 
B 
Piece 
C 
Intonation 1: Before Practice 2.83 3.67 2.83 
 2: After Practicing A 3.33 3.00 2.50 
 3: Before Practicing B 3.33 2.67 2.67 
 4: After Practicing B 3.17 4.17 3.00 
 5: After 14-Day Delay 3.33 3.00 1.67 
Rhythm 1: Before Practice 2.83 2.33 2.50 
 2: After Practicing A 4.00 2.83 2.33 
 3: Before Practicing B 2.83 2.17 2.67 
 4: After Practicing B 3.67 3.83 3.00 
 5: After 14-Day Delay 4.33 2.67 2.67 
Tone 1: Before Practice 3.17 3.00 3.33 
 2: After Practicing A 3.67 2.83 2.50 
 3: Before Practicing B 3.50 2.83 2.67 
 4: After Practicing B 3.17 4.00 3.17 
 5: After 14-Day Delay 3.83 3.17 2.50 
Overall 1: Before Practice 2.83 2.83 2.50 
 2: After Practicing A 3.83 3.00 2.67 
 3: Before Practicing B 3.17 2.17 2.67 
 4: After Practicing B 3.17 4.00 3.00 
 5: After 14-Day Delay 3.67 3.00 2.00 
 
 
3.4.4. Discussion 
Study III investigated the learning of novel viola pieces from written sheet 
music in a profoundly amnesic patient with bilateral MTL damage whose 
hippocampus has been nearly completely destroyed. Despite LSJ’s extremely 
severe anterograde amnesia, two separate analyses of her music performance 
showed clear and systematic improvement after practice as compared to an 
unpracticed control piece. Effects of learning were observed both on the day of 
practice and still 14 days after practice. 
The results show that non-hippocampal structures alone can support 
cognitively complex learning such as learning for music performance through 
sight-reading. Previous studies have shown simple motor learning to be possible 
without the hippocampus. However, unlike motor tasks that involve repetition 
of simple motor movements, music performance through sight-reading is a 
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complex process that poses high cognitive demands and requires the execution 
of unique motor sequences the performer has never encountered before.  
It is important to note that the results do not suggest that LSJ’s learning was 
normal or on a par to that of a neurologically intact musician. Although no data 
are available that would allow comparisons to her pre-morbid level of 
performance, it is more than likely that LSJ would have shown superior learning 
prior to her illness. While the results of Study III show that at least some 
learning can occur even in the complete absence of the hippocampus, it is 
important to bear in mind that the MTL- and non-MTL-based memory systems 
normally function in unison. The integrity of the MTL/hippocampal system 
would certainly have assisted LSJ in any complex learning tasks, including the 
one used here. 
In the intact brain, both the MTL and some, many or all various non-MTL-
based learning mechanisms are likely simultaneously active. There is evidence 
to suggest that the relative degree of engagement of MTL versus non-MTL-
based mechanisms during learning may depend on which aspect of the to-be-
learned material is focused on. Furthermore, their relative engagement may 
change during the time course of learning (Poldrack et al., 2001). Thus, despite 
important dissociations such as the one demonstrated here, it is important to 
keep in mind that in the intact brain, the different learning mechanisms are 
likely to interact dynamically during learning.  
So, what might the non-MTL mechanisms be that supported learning in LSJ’s 
case? On the basis of Study III, it is not possible to identify the brain 
mechanisms that supported LSJ’s learning⎯other than that the learning did not 
depend on intact hippocampal tissue. However, several interesting possibilities 
are available for consideration. Various brain mechanisms have been proposed 
to explain the learning that has been observed in amnesic patients with MTL 
damage. For example, the basal ganglia, the cerebellum and the neocortex have 
been implicated (Cave & Squire, 1992; Eichenbaum, 2000; Knowlton et al., 
1996; Schacter & Buckner, 1998; Tulving & Schacter, 1990; Woodruff-Pak et al., 
1996). In addition, although virtually all of LSJ’s hippocampal tissue has been 
lost, some tissue remains in her parahippocampal, entorhinal, and perirhinal 
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cortices. It seems possible that some or all of these structures may have 
contributed to LSJ’s learning. 
In addition to the brain systems mentioned above, other mechanisms may 
also have contributed to the observed learning. Because of its inherent 
complexity and sensory multimodal nature, music performance engages brain 
regions that are likely to encompass nearly the whole brain. For example, 
auditory, visual, tactile and motor areas of the cortex are all involved during 
sight-reading (Altenmüller & Schneider, 2009; Peretz & Zatorre, 2005; Zatorre 
et al., 2007). If learning can generally be supported by inherent plasticity as a 
property of cerebral cortex in general, as suggested by Reber (2013), these 
regions could perhaps all be potential candidates for supporting at least some 
aspects of the observed learning. In addition, specific aspects of music 
performance such as controlling timing, for example, have been linked to the 
cerebellum, basal ganglia and the supplementary motor area, and the execution 
of rhythmic patterns to the dorsal premotor cortex, lateral cerebellar 
hemispheres and prefrontal cortex (Janata & Grafton, 2003; Levitin & 
Tirovolas, 2009; Zatorre et al., 2007). Retrieval processes from long-term 
memory, on the other hand, are thought to depend on inferior frontal regions 
(Peretz & Zatorre, 2005).  
Conceivably, the recruitment of such wide-ranging networks of cortical and 
subcortical brain mechanisms could help in supporting the observed learning. 
Future studies will hopefully further elucidate these mechanisms and the ways 
they interact. 
3.5. Study IV 
3.5.1. Does new memory acquisition affect sensory cortical processing? 
Study III investigated the neural basis of new memory acquisition by examining 
whether brain structures outside the MTL/hippocampal system can support 
learning in a cognitively complex task. A second question not fully understood 
regarding the neural basis of new memory acquisition concerns the extent to 
which non-MTL-based brain regions, such as the sensory cortices, may 
contribute to the process of new declarative-memory acquisition. Study IV is 
concerned with the latter question. 
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Evidence indicates that the MTL interacts with non-MTL-based structures 
when new memories are acquired (Poldrack et al., 2001). However, in contrast 
to the considerable amount of research on the hippocampus and the MTL, 
relatively few studies have tried to understand how the MTL/hippocampal 
system interacts with other brain areas when new declarative memories are 
acquired (e.g., Simons & Spiers, 2003).  
One reason for the relative dearth of studies on the interaction between the 
MTL and sensory processing may be related to traditional views of how these 
regions function. Traditionally the MTL/hippocampal region has been seen as a 
system exclusively specialized for declarative memory that has little to do with 
functions such as perception or attention (e.g., Squire et al., 2004). Similarly, 
sensory processing areas have been considered (at least relatively) modular. 
Sensory systems have been viewed as (at least relatively) independent of other 
sensory modalities and of MTL-driven memory processes (Fodor, 1983). Thus, 
sensory processing and memory acquisition have mostly been studied 
separately from each other.  
The traditional view that the MTL/hippocampal system functions in isolation 
from perceptual processing has been recently challenged (Henke, 2010; Nadel & 
Peterson, 2013; Shohamy & Turk-Browne, 2013). Several authors have argued 
that the MTL may not function as exclusively in the service of declarative 
memory as previously thought. In vision, for example, damage to the perirhinal 
cortex of the MTL impairs several types of perceptual judgment in visual 
discrimination tasks, which has lead some authors to conclude that MTL areas 
have important functions in online visual perceptual processing in addition to 
subserving memory (Barense et al., 2012). Consistent with this view, Nadel and 
Peterson (2013) argue that the hippocampus integrates sensory information to 
distinguish between singular episodic events and wholistic patterns. In their 
view, the hippocampus functions via dynamic feed-forward-feedback 
connections. Nadel and Peterson (2013) argue that through such connections, 
hippocampal function also affects sensory processing in a top-down fashion.  
If the notion is correct that MTL and hippocampal function affect sensory 
processing, could evidence of this interaction be seen during new memory 
formation⎯a process driven by the MTL/hippocampal memory system? That is, 
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might the MTL-driven memory processes directly affect the brain systems in the 
sensory cortices? Do sensory cortices interact with the MTL when new 
memories are encoded, for example, by modulating their responses?  
This question has not been investigated directly, but several pieces of 
evidence suggest that the encoding of new memories might modulate sensory 
cortical processing. First, sensory processing in auditory cortex is known to be 
modulated by top-down effects such as attention (Fujiwara, Nagamine, Imai, 
Tanaka, & Shibasaki, 1998; Näätänen, 1992). Conceivably, perhaps the 
acquisition of new declarative memories might also affect concurrent auditory 
processing.  
A second source of evidence that sensory cortical areas might be affected by 
new memory encoding comes from research indicating that auditory cortex is 
able to support at least some forms of long-term memory representation. Some 
patients with MTL damage⎯including patient HM⎯have shown preserved 
learning in certain conditioning tasks that involve auditory tones (Woodruff-
Pak, 1993). Corkin (2013) argues that this learning is supported by auditory 
cortex. More generally, learning is known to modify the representation of 
acoustic information in auditory cortex (Weinberger, 2007a; Weinberger, 
2007b). For example, Polley, Steinberg and Merzenich (2006) trained two 
groups of rats to respond to the same set of auditory stimuli, such that one 
group was rewarded for responding to changes in frequency and the other for 
responding to changes in intensity. After training, both primary auditory cortex 
and the suprarhinal auditory field showed training-induced cortical 
reorganization that was specific for the auditory feature on which they had been 
trained8. Grosso et al. (2015) also argue that primary auditory cortex plays an 
important role in many forms of long-term learning (such as conditioning and 
emotional learning). 
In sum, previous studies show (1) that the MTL/hippocampal memory 
system interacts with other memory systems during the acquisition of new 
memories, (2) that top-down processes such as selective attention modulate 
sensory processing in auditory cortex, and (3) that auditory cortex can support 
                                                
8 Roughly analogous top-down effects have been reported for primary visual cortex (Li, 
Piech, & Gilbert, 2004). 
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at least some forms of memory representation. However, the potential 
interaction of MTL structures and auditory cortex during the encoding of 
memories has not been directly investigated. In particular, it is not known how 
task-irrelevant sounds are processed in the brain during the simultaneous 
encoding of new memory representations. 
The aim of Study IV was to investigate whether a sensory cortical area⎯the 
human auditory cortex⎯modulates its pattern of responding during the 
encoding of new declarative memories unrelated to the incoming auditory 
stimuli. To this end, Study IV used a time- and space-sensitive brain-imaging 
method, magnetoencephalography (MEG), to record brain activity for irrelevant 
tones during the acquisition of declarative memory representations.  
While in Study III the question was whether the required learning would be 
possible without the hippocampus, the situation is quite different here. Study IV 
used a declarative memory task that requires memory for serial order and 
explicit verbal recall, both of which are known to recruit the MTL/hippocampal 
memory system (Eichenbaum, 2000; Gabrieli, 1998; Henke, 2010; Jonides et 
al., 2008; Ranganath & D'Esposito, 2001; Squire & Knowlton, 2000; Squire et 
al., 2004; Squire & Wixted, 2011). Thus, in this context, potential modulation in 
the activity of the auditory cortex can reasonably be assumed to occur in concert 
with, or at least simultaneously with the activation of the MTL/hippocampal 
memory system.  
However, many other brain areas in addition to the MTL undoubtedly also 
contribute to the processing required by a memory task under complicated 
conditions. For example, executive processes are presumably also needed when 
one tries to keep distracting auditory stimulation out during the memorization 
of visually presented material. Therefore, to focus on the effects of memory 
processes specifically, three different levels of difficulty were used in the 
memory task. In one condition, the subjects had no memory load; in the second, 
the subjects were given a low memory load; and in the third, a high memory 
load was introduced. If MTL/hippocampally-driven memory processes 
specifically affect auditory cortex function, such effects should be seen, 
presumably, as a function of increasing memory load. 
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3.5.1.1. The irrelevant sound effect 
Study IV was conducted in the context of a well-established behavioral 
phenomenon, the irrelevant sound effect (ISE, also called the irrelevant speech 
effect). The ISE refers to the finding that when irrelevant background speech, 
music or tones are presented during a declarative memory task⎯typically 
requiring serial recall⎯the irrelevant auditory stimuli cause a clear disruption 
in memory performance relative to a silent control condition (Bell, Dentale, 
Buchner, & Mayr, 2010; Colle & Welsh, 1976; Elliott & Briganti, 2012; Jones & 
Macken, 1993; Miles, Jones, & Madden, 1991; Neath, 2000; Salamé & Baddeley, 
1982). 
From a theoretical perspective, the ISE has been predominantly studied in 
the contexts of short-term memory and attention. One of the proposed accounts 
attributes the ISE to the operation of the verbal subcomponent of working 
memory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Salamé, 1989; Salamé & Baddeley, 1982), 
while a competing explanation ascribes it to processes representing serial order 
in short-term memory (Jones & Macken, 1993; Jones, Beaman, & Macken, 
1996). In a third, non-memory based account, Cowan (1995) has argued that the 
effect is a consequence of capacity limitations in the focus of attention. How the 
effect should best be explained, however, is still under debate (Bell, Röer, 
Dentale, & Buchner, 2012; Buchner, Bell, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2008; 
Campbell, Winkler, Kujala, & Näätänen, 2003; Elliott & Briganti, 2012; 
Gisselgard, Petersson, Baddeley, & Ingvar, 2003; Gisselgård, Petersson, & 
Ingvar, 2004; Hanley & Shah, 2012; Lange, 2005; Little, Martin, & Thomson, 
2010; Neath, 2000; Page & Norris, 2003; Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 2014; 
Schlittmeier, Weissgerber, Kerber, Fastl, & Hellbrueck, 2012; Viswanathan, 
Dorsi, & George, 2014). 
While immediate recall is typically used within the ISE paradigm and 
experimental results have mostly been used to inform theories of short-term 
memory and attention, the ISE paradigm also lends itself to the investigation of 
declarative memory encoding processes in general. Although many short-term 
and long-term memory processes are dissociable (Baddeley, 1986; Cowan, 
2008; Warrington, Logue, & Pratt, 1971), initially short- and long-term memory 
acquisition processes overlap (e.g., Jonides et al., 2008; Moscovitch et al., 
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2006). That is, during the phase when the stimuli are initially presented⎯in the 
ISE paradigm, typically one by one in a relatively fast succession⎯encoding 
processes cannot differentiate whether the to-be-remembered material will have 
to be recalled immediately or after a (short or a long) delay. Important 
differences between short- and long-term memory processes obviously emerge 
immediately if recall is delayed after stimulus presentation, leading in turn to 
the recruitment of (at least partly) divergent neural processes also (Jonides et 
al., 2008; Ranganath & D'Esposito, 2001). In contrast, however, during the 
initial stimulus presentation phase when the material is being encoded in 
memory, the encoding processes are unlikely to depend prospectively on the 
time of memory retrieval in the future.9 Arguably, therefore, the cognitive 
processes that support the acquisition of new declarative-memory 
representations during the encoding phase will not differ depending on whether 
retrieval will be delayed after encoding, or on the length of such a retention 
interval. Thus, a typical ISE task is also suited to the investigation of encoding 
processes in declarative memory in general. 
Consistent with the notion that initial memory-encoding processes do not 
depend on whether immediate or delayed recall will be required, evidence 
indicates that memory tasks typically used in the ISE paradigm⎯such as 
memorizing series of letters⎯engage the hippocampus and the MTL even when 
immediate recall is required (Henke, 2010; Kalm, Davis, & Norris, 2013; Nee & 
Jonides, 2013; van Vugt et al., 2010). Hippocampal involvement seems 
especially strong when memory load is high (Axmacher et al., 2007). Several 
authors have recently argued more generally that the role of the hippocampus 
does not seem to depend on the length of the retention interval (Henke, 2010; 
Yee, Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2014), also consistent with the notion that the 
memory-encoding phase in a typical ISE-paradigm task recruits the 
MTL/hippocampal memory system regardless of whether recall is delayed. 
According to the review of the evidence by Jonides et al. (2008), MTL structures 
                                                
9 One can imagine being told to memorize, in serial order, a string of digits presented 
visually in quick succession. How would you go about memorizing the digits if you knew you 
would be asked to retrieve them (a) immediately after presentation, or (b) an hour after 
presentation? Phenomenologically, it would seem that the two tasks would begin to diverge 
immediately after presentation, but not before the presentation of the stimuli has ended. 
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are important in both short-term and long-term-memory tasks for supporting 
the creation of novel memory representations, especially the binding of items to 
context in novel ways. 
In the ISE paradigm, while the participant is memorizing the visually 
presented material, sounds are simultaneously presented that are irrelevant to 
the memory task. As any audible stimulation automatically activates the sensory 
cortical processing mechanisms related to auditory perception, the brain 
responses for the irrelevant sounds can be used to index sensory processing in 
auditory cortex during the construction of new declarative-memory 
representations. Therefore, the ISE paradigm provides an ideal context in which 
the potential interaction between the MTL/hippocampally-driven declarative-
memory acquisition processes and sensory cortical processing can be 
investigated.  
Is sensory auditory processing affected by concurrent declarative-memory 
encoding known to depend on the MTL and the hippocampus? In Study IV, 
brain responses were recorded to irrelevant sounds while the participants were 
engaged in a declarative-memory task unrelated to the presented sounds. The 
study utilized whole-head magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure event-
related magnetic fields (ERF’s) while the subjects memorized visually presented 
digits.  
Conceivably, memory acquisition might have different effects on sensory 
processing depending on whether the material is easy to memorize or whether 
the task requires active effort. To take this into consideration, the experiment 
included a no-task condition, in which the participants had no memory task at 
all, a low-load condition, in which memory-task demands were low, and a high-
load condition, in which the memory task was considerably difficult. In 
addition, to investigate potential differences between the active encoding phase 
and the maintenance of the memorized material in mind, brain responses to 
irrelevant tones were recorded separately for the memory encoding phase 
during which the to-be-memorized material was presented and a subsequent 
retention phase, during which the memorized material had to be kept in mind. 
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3.5.2. Methods 
3.5.2.1. Participants 
Twenty neurologically normal adult subjects participated in the behavioral part 
of the experiment (mean age 26; range 18-51; 9 male; 2 left-handed). All 
subjects reported normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Of 
all subjects, 15 also participated in MEG measurements. 
3.5.2.2. Stimuli 
The digits used in the memory task were presented on a computer display in 
white against a black background. In the MEG measurements, the digits (width 
ca. 3 cm; height ca. 5.5 cm) were projected onto a screen 210 cm from the 
subject (visual angle ca. 1.5°). The digits ranged either from 0 to 8 or from 1 to 4, 
depending on experimental condition (see below). Each digit was shown for 700 
ms (offset-to-onset ISI 300 ms). 
The irrelevant auditory stimuli were pure tones with frequencies of 1000, 
1500, 2000, and 2500 Hz (intensity 80 dB SPL, duration 100 ms). The tones 
were repeated in a fixed repeated sequence from lowest to highest. The 
durations and interstimulus intervals of the auditory stimuli were chosen to 
ensure that the visual and auditory stimuli would overlap as little as possible 
and to rule out any systematic contaminating effects. The offset-to-onset ISI 
between two tones was 387 ms. In the MEG part of the experiment, the tones 
were delivered binaurally through plastic tubes and ear pieces. 
3.5.2.3. Procedure 
Each trial consisted of (1) an encoding phase, during which digits were 
presented one at a time and the participant memorized them, and (2) a 
retention phase of 20 seconds, during which the memorized material had to be 
kept in mind. Irrelevant tones were presented during both phases, except in the 
silent control condition, in which no auditory stimulation was presented. After 
the retention phase, the participant was prompted to report the digits aloud in 
serial order. 
The memory task contained three different conditions: in the difficult task 
condition (DT), the participant had to memorize nine digits in order (high 
memory load), and in the easy task condition (ET), there were four digits to 
memorize (low load). These conditions were compared to a no-task condition 
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(NT), in which nine digits were presented, and the subject was instructed to 
fixate on the digits but not to memorize them (no load). The silent control 
condition was not paired with the low-load or no-load conditions, but only with 
the difficult task condition for the difficult-task control condition (DTC). 
In the DT and NT conditions, there were 18 trials. Because of the low number 
of magnetic responses during a single trial in the ET condition, the number of 
trials was increased to 30. Although the number of trials in the different 
conditions was not large per se, the design allowed the recording of a 
considerable number of ERF’s in every condition. Because of the short duration 
and ISI of the auditory tones, more than a thousand ERF’s could optimally be 
recorded during the encoding and retention phases in only one DT/NT trial.  
The presentation order for the different conditions was determined through a 
latin square design. Six practice trials were presented before data collection was 
begun. 
3.5.2.4. Behavioral data analyses 
In the memory tasks, one point was awarded for a correct digit in the correct 
serial position. The scores were averaged across trials. 
3.5.2.5. Magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
Brain responses were measured with a 306-channel whole-head magnetometer 
with a 600-Hz sampling rate, a pre-stimulus baseline correction of 100 ms, and 
band-pass filtering of 1-30 Hz. Eye movements were measured vertically with 
electrodes above and below the left eye, and horizontally with electrodes at the 
outer canthus of each eye. Epochs containing artifacts were discarded. Event-
related magnetic fields were recorded from the onset of auditory stimuli and 
averaged over a period of 500 ms, including a 100-ms pre-stimulus baseline. 
Epochs were averaged according to task condition (NT, ET, DT) and task phase 
(encoding, retention). At least 240 epochs were collected from each participant 
in each experimental condition and averaged separately. 
The auditory N1m responses were analysed by selecting 44 gradiometer 
sensors from both hemispheres and fitting an unrestricted equivalent current 
dipole (ECD) to the response. Source amplitudes, latencies, locations and 
goodness-of-fit estimates were calculated separately for each participant, task 
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condition, task phase and the left and right hemisphere. Data from two 
participants were excluded from analyses because the averaged goodness-of-fit 
estimates were below 65%. (For further details, see Study IV, materials and 
methods).  
3.5.3. Results 
3.5.3.1. Memory task 
In the ET condition, participants made extremely few errors (mean score for all 
serial positions across all participants 99.6%). In the difficult task (conditions 
DT and DTC), task demands were clearly much higher (see Figure 17). The 
mean proportion of digits participants recalled correctly in a given serial 
position was 57.9%. 
 
 
Figure 17. Serial recall for visually presented digits as a function of serial position in the DT 
(difficult task) and DTC (difficult task, silent control) conditions. Irrelevant tones disrupted 
memory performance as compared to a silent control condition in which no auditory 
stimulation was presented. Vertical bars represent standard errors of the means. 
 
A two-way 9 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA (9 serial positions x 2 auditory 
stimulation conditions) showed that in the difficult task, a digit’s serial position 
affected memory performance (F(8,152) = 38.96, p < 0.001). Planned 
polynomial contrasts showed that as expected (e.g., Jones & Macken, 1993), 
performance declined from the first positions (linear polynomial trend F(1,19) = 
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102.92, p < 0.001) and then plateaued or improved again at final positions 
(quadratic polynomial trend F(1,19) = 10.45, p < 0.01).  
As shown in Figure 17, an irrelevant sound effect was evident in the results. 
Memory performance was superior in the silent control (DTC) condition, in 
which participants remembered 61.5% of the presented digits correctly, relative 
to the irrelevant sound condition (DT), in which only 54.3% of digits were 
reported correctly (F(1,19) = 11.71, p < 0.01). No interaction was observed 
between auditory stimulation and serial position. 
3.5.3.2. Event-related magnetic fields 
The presented tones elicited prominent N1m responses. ECD modelling 
indicated that the responses were generated in the vicinity of auditory cortex in 
the temporal lobes. 
N1m amplitudes. Event-related fields showed that both task condition and 
task phase had a clear effect on auditory processing. The mean N1m response 
amplitudes from the left and right hemispheres in the different task conditions 
and in the two task phases are shown in Figures 18 and 19 and in Table 9. 
A 2 x 2 x 3 repeated-measures ANOVA (hemisphere x task phase x memory 
load) of N1m response amplitudes showed that both task phase (encoding vs. 
retention) and memory load (NT, ET, DT) affected sensory processing, but 
hemisphere (right vs. left) did not. As shown in Figure 19, response amplitudes 
were larger in the encoding than the retention phase (F(1,12) = 92.18, p < 
0.001).  
 
Table 9. The magnitudes of N1m responses to irrelevant auditory tones according to task 
condition (no task, easy load, high load) and phase (encoding, retention). 
 
Memory load N1m response amplitudes (nAm) 
Encoding Retention 
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
No load (NT) 23.32 2.03 14.07 1.30 
Low load (ET) 29.17 3.19 13.74 1.28 
High load (DT) 30.11 2.44 16.16 1.69 
 
 
Interestingly, amplitudes increased with memory load (F(2,24) = 3.61, p < 
0.05). As shown in Figure 18, the N1m amplitude was most prominent in the DT 
condition and smallest in the NT condition (significant linear trend in planned 
  96
polynomial contrasts, F(1,12) = 5.94, p < 0.05). In addition, there was a 
significant interaction between memory load and task phase (F(2,24) = 4.64, p 
< 0.05). This appears to have resulted from a difference in how responses 
changed from encoding to retention in the no-task condition versus the two 
memory-load conditions. While mean response amplitudes dropped by nearly 
or more than 50% during retention in the memory load conditions relative to 
the encoding phase (52.9% and 46.3% in the ET and DT conditions, 
respectively), this reduction was only 39.7% in the no-task condition (planned 
comparisons for encoding vs. retention: NT vs. ET, F(1,12) = 9.08, p < 0.05; NT 
vs. DT, F(1,12) = 6.78, p < 0.05). All other main effects and interactions were 
statistically nonsignificant. 
N1m source locations. Task phase and memory load also affected the 
locations of N1m sources in the temporal lobe. In general, the source was deeper 
during encoding, and memory load shifted source locations along the anterior-
posterior axis. For details, see Study IV. 
 
Figure 18. The mean source strengths of the N1m responses elicited by irrelevant tones during 
the different task conditions, collapsed across encoding and retention phases. As memory load 
was increased from a no-task to an easy-task and a difficult-task condition, the amplitude of the 
N1m response increased in both the left and right hemispheres. The vertical bars represent 
standard errors of the means. 
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Figure 19. The mean source strengths of the N1m responses elicited by irrelevant tones during 
different task phases. The responses were larger during encoding than the retention phase of the 
memory task. The vertical bars represent standard errors of the means. 
 
3.5.4. Discussion 
Study IV investigated the sensory processing of irrelevant tones in the human 
auditory cortex during the acquisition of new declarative-memory 
representations in neurologically healthy adults. Magnetic recordings of neural 
activity showed that the encoding of new declarative memories affects cortical 
auditory processing even when the memory task and the auditory stimulation 
are completely unrelated. N1m response amplitudes for irrelevant tones 
increased as a function of memory load, such that amplitudes were larger in the 
easy-load condition relative to a no-task condition and largest in the high-load 
condition. Response amplitudes were higher during the phase in which new 
memory representations were initially encoded than during the retention phase, 
a 20-second period during which the memorized items had to be kept in mind 
before recall. These results show that the voluntary acquisition of new 
declarative memories affects early sensory processing in the human auditory 
cortex, even when the auditory stimulation is irrelevant for the memory task 
and presented in a different sensory modality. 
That memory acquisition should affect the cortical processing of irrelevant 
sounds is not easily explained by traditional views of memory systems in the 
brain. The acquisition of new declarative memories is thought to be driven by 
the MTL/hippocampal memory system, and these processes have traditionally 
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not been thought to affect sensory processing of unrelated items (e.g., Squire et 
al., 2004). It is not immediately clear why a sensory cortical region should 
modulate its responding for irrelevant items when new declarative memories 
are encoded. Why and how this interaction occurs would seem to warrant 
further investigation in future studies. However, it is interesting to note that 
some authors have recently suggested that MTL regions participate in some 
perceptual processes such as those required in visual discrimination (Barense et 
al., 2012; Squire & Wixted, 2011). The results of Study IV are consistent with 
Nadel and Peterson’s (2013) view that the MTL/hippocampal system functions 
via dynamic feed-forward-feedback mechanisms. Similarly, Shohamy and Turk-
Browne (2013) have suggested that memory systems and the hippocampus 
could be seen as nodes in interactive networks that can influence a wide range of 
cognitive functions, including perception. Conceivably, such feed-forward-
feedback mechanisms or interactive networks could also affect auditory sensory 
processing when new declarative memories are encoded.  
That stronger N1m responses were observed for conditions with higher 
memory load was unexpected. Cortical responses to irrelevant tones were 
expected to decrease as task demands increased in the memory task. 
Presumably, a visually presented memory task might be expected to increase 
processing in non-auditory areas such as those related to attention, working 
memory and the encoding of the to-be-memorized material, such as the 
prefrontal cortices and the MTL. Previous studies have shown attention to 
modulate responses in sensory cortical areas in favor of relevant, not irrelevant 
stimuli (Fujiwara et al., 1998; Näätänen, 1992; Paavilainen, Tiitinen, Alho, & 
Näätänen, 1993; Woldorff, Hackley, & Hillyard, 1991). Studies using 
hemodynamic measures, on the other hand, have indicated greater activity in 
prefrontal areas during memory tasks accompanied by irrelevant speech: 
Gisselgård et al. (2003) reported that in their PET study, regional blood flow 
increased in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex bilaterally, which they 
interpreted to reflect executive functions recruited during the memory task. 
Thus, the increased N1m amplitudes for irrelevant auditory stimuli observed in 
Study IV may seem counterintuitive. 
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Despite the apparent counterintuitiveness of the results, however, research 
conducted after Study IV has reported consistent findings. In an EEG study, Bell 
and colleagues (2010) measured responses to auditory stimuli while 
participants memorized visually presented digits. Similarly to Study IV, Bell et 
al. (2010) also recorded event-related responses separately during encoding 
versus a retention phase before recall. In important ways, the results replicated 
those reported in Study IV. First, the amplitudes of the N1⎯the electric 
counterpart of the N1m⎯were larger during encoding than during retention, 
exactly as in Study IV. Second, although the study design did not include a 
passive no-task condition or an easy-load condition (the NT and ET conditions 
in Study IV) that would permit comparisons between different levels of memory 
load, Bell et al. (2010) did have an interesting comparison of relevance to our 
results: they compared a steady-state auditory stream, in which an identical 
stimulus is presented repeatedly, to a changing-state stream, consisting of 
changing stimuli⎯such as those used in Study IV. A changing-state stream has 
been shown to cause a larger disruption in memory performance than steady-
state stimuli (Jones et al., 1996). Thus, the more distracting changing-state 
stimuli would logically seem to pose higher demands on the cognitive resources 
required for successful encoding⎯perhaps similarly to a higher memory load. 
In Bell et al.’s (2010) study (and consistently with Campbell et al., 2003), the 
auditory stimuli elicited larger N1 amplitudes in a changing-state than in a 
steady-state stream. While this N1-result is not a direct replication of the 
memory-load effect observed in Study IV with N1m amplitudes, the findings are 
certainly consistent: the higher the task demands on declarative-memory 
encoding processes, the higher the N1(m) amplitudes. Thus, these results 
corroborate those from Study IV, showing that a cognitively taxing memory task 
enhances, rather than diminishes, the cortical processing of simultaneous 
irrelevant auditory distractors. Therefore, declarative-memory acquisition 
seems to affect cortical auditory processing in a manner contrary to selective 
attention. Conceivably, this difference could result from the interaction between 
auditory cortex and the medial temporal lobe memory system. Further research 
will hopefully be able to demonstrate whether this hypothesis is correct. 
  100 
As an additional note of interest, a qualitative difference would seem to 
emerge in the auditory processing stream somewhere between the earliest 
sensory processing stages and the cortical processing that the prominent N1m 
wave reflects. Auditory-evoked brainstem responses (ABR) are elicited very 
early, a few milliseconds after the presentation of the stimulus. The ABR 
response is thought to reflect activity transmitted through the brainstem 
towards the thalamus and thus to index a very different stage of processing than 
post-thalamic processing in auditory cortex. Interestingly, ABR recordings for 
unattended sounds during memory encoding have shown amplitudes to 
decrease, rather than to increase, as memory load is increased⎯i.e., in a 
pattern opposite to the one observed in Study IV (Sorqvist, Stenfelt, & 
Ronnberg, 2012). Thus, apparently in these earliest stages of processing, an 
increased memory load decreases neural responses for unattended sounds, 
while the opposite effect emerges (roughly) 100 milliseconds later in auditory 
cortex. It is interesting to speculate whether the involvement of the MTL 
memory system might account for this difference: conceivably, the ABR 
response could occur too early for the MTL to be engaged, whereas the N1m is 
elicited late enough to allow MTL involvement. Future research will hopefully 
elucidate the neural mechanisms accounting for this difference.  
As a concluding remark, a particular limitation of Study IV should be noted. 
Specific care was taken to design the experiment in a way that would avoid 
several potential pitfalls. For example, the irrelevant tones and the visual 
presentation of the digits had to be carefully coordinated to avoid stimuli from 
one modality contaminating the brain responses to stimuli from another. 
However, despite successfully controlling for a number of such confounding 
factors, the experimental design still does leave some important questions 
unanswered. One of them concerns the differences in neural responses between 
the encoding and the retention phases of the memory task. To ensure a 
sufficient signal-to-noise ratio, the recorded brain responses were averaged 
across the task phase as a uniform block. Unfortunately, these averaged 
responses do not permit further analyses of possible changes that may have 
occurred within a task phase. As a relevant possibility, sensory processing 
systems in auditory cortex could habituate to the ongoing auditory stimulation 
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over time. In a recent well-conducted behavioral study, Bell and colleagues 
(2012) reported that in five separate experiments, the irrelevant sound effect 
was markedly reduced after passive listening to the distractory auditory 
material before the memory task. Although there are important differences 
between Bell et al.’s (2012) materials and the ones used here⎯for example, the 
use of speech as a distractor⎯their results nevertheless suggest that some 
habituation effects may occur during the task. Amplitudes of N1 responses have 
also been shown to diminish over time if identical stimuli are presented 
repeatedly (Näätänen & Picton, 1987; Näätänen, 1992). Conceivably, the 
amplitude difference seen between the encoding and the retention phases may 
have resulted partly from habituation effects. Partly alleviating this concern, 
however, is that the auditory stream used was “changing-state”⎯i.e., the tone 
sequence consisted of different-frequency tones. Tones of changing frequencies 
should be somewhat more resistant to habituation effects than identical stimuli 
that are repeated monotonously. Future research will hopefully shed more light 
on this issue as well. 
In sum, the results of Study IV showed that the acquisition of new declarative 
memories affects the processing of auditory stimuli in the auditory cortex, even 
when the auditory stimuli are irrelevant to the memory task and presented in a 
different modality. This finding is consistent with the notion that during the 
construction of new declarative memories, the MTL/hippocampal memory 
system interacts with brain mechanisms that perform early sensory feature 
analyses of incoming auditory stimuli. While both MTL/hippocampally-driven 
memory processes and prefrontally-driven executive processes are considered 
important for the ability to keep irrelevant distractors at bay during the 
acquisition of new memories, the results of Study IV suggest that other early 
sensory processing mechanisms may be relevant as well. The results suggest 
that modulation of activity in sensory areas in the cortex may also contribute 
when the influence of irrelevant distractors needs to be suppressed during new 
memory acquisition. 
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3.6. The Neural Basis for the Acquisition of Memory 
Representations 
Part Two of this dissertation investigated the neural basis for the acquisition of 
new memory representations. While prior studies have established that the 
MTL/hippocampal memory system is crucial for the construction of new 
declarative memories, the role of non-hippocampal structures and non-MTL-
based neural systems and their interaction with the MTL have received far less 
attention. Two studies in Part Two of this dissertation investigated potential 
ways in which non-hippocampal and non-MTL-based structures may contribute 
to the construction of new memories in the intact brain. 
Study III studied learning in a rare case of amnesia in a context that involves 
motor control but is cognitively complex. The study was conducted with LSJ, a 
profoundly amnesic patient with bilateral MTL damage including the near-
complete bilateral destruction of the hippocampus. The results of Study III 
showed that LSJ performed novel viola pieces consistently better after targeted 
practice relative to an unpracticed control piece. Learning was observed both in 
note-by-note analyses and in subjective whole-piece performance ratings 
conducted by experienced string instrumentalists. To our knowledge, this was 
the first demonstration that non-hippocampal structures alone can support 
some learning of new music via sight-reading for music performance, as prior 
studies have not been able to rule out the potential contribution of remaining 
hippocampal tissue. Together with previous findings (Altenmüller & Schneider, 
2009; Palmer & Meyer, 2000; Palmer, 2006; Reber, 2013; Robertson, 2007; 
Schendan et al., 2003; Stark et al., 2002; Watanabe et al., 2008; Wilson & 
Saling, 2008), the results suggest that both the MTL/hippocampal memory 
system and non-hippocampal structures cooperate in the intact brain in the 
construction of new memory representations when new music is learned for 
performance.  
Study IV used magnetoencephalography to investigate sensory processing of 
irrelevant sounds in the human auditory cortex in neurologically intact adults 
when new declarative memories were encoded. The results showed that the 
acquisition of declarative-memory representations enhanced sensory processing 
in the auditory cortex. Together with prior studies that have shown memory 
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load to modulate neural activity in the hippocampus (van Vugt et al., 2010) and 
in other MTL regions (Axmacher et al., 2007), the results of Study IV suggest 
that when new declarative memories are acquired, the MTL/hippocampal 
memory system works in concert with other neural networks already at a level 
as early as the feature-analysis systems devoted to sensory cortical processing. 
The results challenge traditional views that have assumed sensory systems to 
operate independently of each other (e.g., Fodor, 1983) and of the 
MTL/hippocampal memory system (e.g., Squire et al., 2004). 
The results of Part Two show that several brain regions are actively involved 
when new memory representations are initially acquired. On the one hand, the 
learning required in both of the experimental tasks used in Part Two depends 
on the hippocampus. Although the learning of new music for performance and 
the learning of serial order in a declarative-memory task are inherently very 
different, in both tasks the required learning depends in part on the ability to 
acquire memories for single items and on the ability to form novel associations 
between previously unrelated items. Prior studies have established that the 
hippocampus is essential for these abilities (Gold, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006; 
Henke, Buck, Weber, & Wieser, 1997; Henke et al., 1999; Stark & Squire, 2003). 
Both of the tasks used in Studies III and IV also required the material to be 
learned in a temporally sequential pattern, one that unfolds over time. 
Functional neuroimaging studies have shown the hippocampus to be engaged in 
neurologically intact humans when temporal sequences are learned (Robertson, 
2007; Schendan et al., 2003). In addition, studies with non-human animals 
have also demonstrated performance impairments in temporal sequence 
completion tasks when the hippocampus is lesioned in laboratory animals 
(Hoang & Kesner, 2008), suggesting that the hippocampus is necessary for 
learning that requires temporal order. The results of Part Two extend these 
results by showing that in addition to MTL-based and hippocampal structures 
known to be critical for learning, non-MTL-based and non-hippocampal 
structures also subserve memory-acquisition processes in the intact brain. 
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4. General Discussion: Levels of Analysis, Converging 
Evidence and Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience 
According to Marr’s (1982) influential proposal, understanding any complex 
information-processing system requires three levels of analysis: A complete 
explanation needs to account for the system’s behavior at the computational, 
the algorithmic/representational, and the implementation levels. Although the 
details of Marr’s proposal have been debated, the requirement of multiple levels 
of analysis remains a central principle in the study of cognition (e.g., Peebles & 
Cooper, 2015). In cognitive neuroscience, the levels are typically regarded as 
semi-independent, with each level seen as providing constraints on the others 
(e.g., Ochsner & Kosslyn, 2014).  
How can different methodological approaches inform multiple levels of 
analysis in understanding how the brain enables the mind? Through four 
empirical studies, this dissertation attempts to elucidate some aspects of this 
question. More precisely, an attempt is made to demonstrate four 
methodological points: (1) that an important source of evidence for formulating 
hypotheses at the cognitive level comes from the study of cognitive deficits, (2) 
that a detailed, empirically-driven cognitive framework is particularly valuable 
for guiding future research both at the levels of cognitive function and neural 
implementation, (3) that studies of brain-damaged individuals can provide 
important complementary evidence to functional neuroimaging about how 
cognitive processes are neurally implemented, and (4) that magnetic recordings 
of brain activity can be informative of multi-regional interaction at the neural 
level. Each of these points is discussed in turn, with a particular emphasis on 
the relative advantages and limitations of single-patient studies of cognitive 
deficits. Finally, recommendations and methodological notes are made 
concerning future research.  
4.1. Levels of analysis and the investigation of cognitive 
deficits  
Experimental studies of cognitive deficits are often seen as particularly 
informative when used for collecting fine-grained evidence at the cognitive level. 
This is also one of the suggestions of this thesis: that a particularly useful source 
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of evidence for formulating and testing cognitive theories comes from the study 
of cognitive deficits.  
4.1.1. Advantages of the single-patient method for studies of cognition 
One of the advantages of studying cognitive deficits is that they can provide a 
unique window into cognitive functions that is not easily available through other 
means (Caramazza, 1992; Caramazza & Coltheart, 2006; Coltheart, 2001; Frith, 
1998; Humphreys & Price, 2001; Martin & Hull, 2007; McCloskey, 2001; 2003). 
The normal cognitive system is assumed to consist of several subcomponents 
that are functionally (at least relatively) distinct and devoted to processing 
disparate kinds of information. Often the role of these subcomponents can be 
seen more clearly when some of them have been selectively impaired and others 
spared.  
Studies I and II used detailed analyses of patterns of impaired performance 
to shed light on the cognitive representations and cognitive processes that 
support the ability to appreciate the spatial orientation of perceived objects. The 
results suggested that spatial orientation representations are compositional in 
nature. This hypothesis might not have suggested itself as easily on the basis of 
evidence from healthy participants only, as the compositional nature of these 
representations (if this suggestion is correct) is not as readily apparent in the 
performance of neurologically intact adults (Gregory & McCloskey, 2010; 
Gregory et al., 2011).  
The workings of different subcomponents in the cognitive system can, of 
course, be studied in the healthy population. In the intact system, however, 
when all relevant subcomponents and processes are simultaneously active, the 
possibilities of investigating their relative roles independently are more limited. 
For example, in Study IV, a modulation of N1m responses was seen as a 
function of memory load. There are several different memory systems, however. 
Was the observed modulation caused by the engagement of short-term memory 
processes, declarative long-term memory encoding processes, or both? The 
answer is unclear, as presumably both of these were activated during the same 
task. Disentangling these processes experimentally in intact participants is 
challenging, because all memory-related processes are (or at least can be) active 
simultaneously.  
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Thus, studies of cognitive deficits offer a rare possibility to investigate 
cognition in a way that can bypass some of the limitations in studying intact 
human participants. This dissertation extends the substantial body of literature 
showing that single-patient studies of individuals with cognitive impairments 
are a powerful source of evidence for understanding the human visual system, 
spatial representation and normal cognitive function (e.g., Behrmann, Winocur, 
& Moscovitch, 1992; Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978; Buxbaum, 2006; Caramazza & 
Hillis, 1990a; 1990b; Cooper & Humphreys, 2000; Davidoff & Warrington, 
1999; Dilks, Serences, Rosenau, Yantis, & McCloskey, 2007; Farah, 1990; 
Fendrich, Wessinger, & Gazzaniga, 1992; Friedman-Hill, Robertson, & 
Treisman, 1995; Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Humphreys, 1999; 
Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006; Leek, 2001; Milner & Goodale, 2006; 
Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997; Pflugshaupt et al., 2007; Priftis et al., 
2003; Rapp, 2001; Sahraie, Hibbard, Trevethan, Ritchie, & Weiskrantz, 2010; 
Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, & Walsh, 2007; Turnbull & McCarthy, 1996) 
4.1.2. Cognitive theories as a guide for functional neuroimaging 
In addition to having inherent value, an understanding of cognitive processes is 
also critical for investigating how cognitive functions are implemented in the 
brain. Neural activation patterns, such as those studied using functional 
neuroimaging, are informative of how the brain enables the mind only if one 
understands the psychological phenomena to which the patterns of neural 
activation are related (Wager & Lindquist, 2011). Simply collecting functional 
neuroimaging data from participants without an understanding of the cognitive 
function under investigation leads to a disorganized picture uninformative of 
the processes involved (Cooper & Peebles, 2015), because the value of functional 
neuroimaging methods is limited if the mental functions under investigation are 
poorly specified (Love, 2015). In the words of Cooper and Peebles (2015 p. 248), 
“the neurophysiological/implementation level appears to be the wrong level to 
begin”.  
Therefore, a critical understanding of processes and representations at the 
cognitive level is crucial for guiding investigation and the interpretation of data 
at the level of neural processing. The level of representation and algorithm can 
be described as an essential bridge between what an information-processing 
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system is trying to do and how this is physically instantiated (Peebles & Cooper, 
2015). Coltheart (2010b) has suggested that functional neuroimaging studies 
could be vastly more productive if they made better use of the best existing 
contemporary cognitive models of the processes they investigate. In practice, 
neuroimaging work is not always conducted this way. In Poldrack’s words 
(2010, p. 149), “Whereas formal theories from cognitive psychology could often 
provide substantial guidance as to the design of such tasks, it is uncommon for 
neuroimaging studies to take meaningful guidance from such theories”. 
The COR framework proposed in Study II provides an example of how a 
detailed, empirically driven cognitive-level hypothesis can guide functional 
neuroimaging. COR has already been used for investigating orientation 
representations in intact adults (Gregory & McCloskey, 2010) and in normally 
developing children (Gregory et al., 2011), and it is currently being applied to 
the investigation of spatial orientation processing in the brain using functional 
neuroimaging (Hatfield et al., 2014; Hatfield et al., under review). Thus, the 
development of the COR hypothesis and the on-going process of inquiry in 
subsequent studies demonstrate one possible way in which a detailed 
hypothesis at the cognitive level can inform research at other levels of analysis, 
including neuroimaging.  
4.1.3. Brain-damaged patients and theories of brain function 
In addition to informing cognitive theories, experimental data from brain-
damaged patients can also be valuable for investigating how cognitive functions 
are implemented in the brain. In Study III, the single-patient approach was 
used to investigate whether particular brain structures can support specific 
cognitive abilities.  
4.1.3.1. Advantages of patient studies for investigating brain function 
In the investigation of brain function, the single-patient method complements 
evidence provided by functional neuroimaging and electromagnetic 
measurements in healthy participants. Through the use of carefully designed 
experiments, studies of brain-damaged patients can be particularly informative 
for establishing whether a given neural structure is necessary for a given 
cognitive function.  
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In investigating the role a given brain structure plays in cognition, the single-
patient method has certain advantages over functional neuroimaging methods 
(McCloskey, 2001). First, the level of inference is weaker in evidence based on 
functional neuroimaging than on brain damage. For example, one cannot infer 
that the activation in a given brain region is necessary for a cognitive function 
on the basis of functional neuroimaging data alone (e.g., Rorden & Karnath, 
2004). In addition, increased activation in a brain region to a given set of 
stimuli or in a particular task does not mean that the region is unresponsive to 
other kinds of stimuli or during other tasks. Empirical evidence shows that the 
same brain regions are often activated in functional neuroimaging studies even 
when the assumed cognitive processes are different (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). 
Further, brain activity is a function of both excitation and inhibition, and 
increased inhibition can lead to increased metabolism, affecting the BOLD 
signal (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Wager et al., 2007).  
For these reasons, studies of brain-damaged patients can provide important 
converging evidence for neuroimaging findings. Recently, a single-patient study 
of LSJ⎯the same patient as in Study III⎯provided evidence that the MTL is 
necessary for statistical learning, the ability to detect statistical regularities in 
sensory input over repeated exposure to patterns containing co-occurring items 
(Schapiro et al., 2014). Previous fMRI studies had implicated the MTL and the 
hippocampus (see Schapiro et al., 2014), but these findings had left open the 
possibility that these structures could be merely epiphenomenally involved but 
not necessary. The study by Schapiro et al. (2014) importantly complements 
these findings by providing converging evidence that the MTL plays a critical 
role in statistical learning. 
A second advantage is that patient studies are more easily applicable to 
certain questions than other techniques in cognitive neuroscience. For example, 
neuroimaging healthy participants cannot be used for investigating whether a 
cognitive function can be performed without a particular neural structure.10 The 
                                                
10 A method that can be used to ask questions of this type is transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). TMS can be used to interfere with normal neural processing in a brain area 
to investigate whether it is necessary for a particular cognitive function. A detailed discussion of 
this method is beyond the scope of this thesis, but for introductions to TMS, see Walsh & 
Pascual-Leone (2003) and Stewart & Walsh (2006). 
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absence of activation in a neuroimaging study does not necessarily mean that 
the area has no functional role (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). Functional MRI 
cannot detect the possible contribution of an area that is constantly active in all 
task conditions, if a change does not occur in blood flow. Neuroimaging 
methods can sometimes fail to detect functionally necessary regions because the 
BOLD signal may increase only marginally in some regions because of their 
generally high blood flow, or simply because the resolution is inadequate. (For 
further reasons, see Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Wager et al., 2007). 
In contrast, the single-patient approach is well suited for investigating 
questions of this type, as Study III shows. Prior neuroimaging studies had 
indirectly suggested that the hippocampus is engaged when new music is 
learned for performance (see Study III). Even if this evidence were direct, it 
would not allow any conclusions about whether some learning of new music is 
possible without the hippocampus. Study III provided evidence for this 
possibility, complementing previous neuroimaging findings.  
As a third advantage, the single-patient approach can also be used for 
studying functions involving complex motor behavior. An example of this is 
Study III, which investigated how the learning of new material for music 
performance is supported neurally. Neuroimaging participants playing real 
instruments (such as the viola in Study III) is technically difficult, which partly 
explains the relative dearth of cognitive neuroscience studies investigating 
music performance as compared to music recognition (Levitin & Tirovolas, 
2009; Peretz & Zatorre, 2005). 
As a fourth advantage, the logic of inference is more direct in studies of brain-
damaged patients. The inferences based on fMRI activation patterns rely on 
numerous methodological assumptions about how the signal is derived, 
complicating the interpretation of data. This complexity in combination with 
numerous possibilities for data analysis can lead to spurious findings or 
misleading interpretations (Bennett, Wolford, & Miller, 2009; Mole & Klein, 
2010; Poline, Thirion, Roche, & Meriaux, 2010; Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011; Vul & Kanwisher, 2010). Because of these issues, several 
authors have pointed out the need for increased methodological rigor in future 
neuroimaging studies (Poldrack, 2012). Thus, despite fMRI’s prominence and 
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widespread use, many unresolved questions remain about its optimal use, 
caveats and about the interpretation of results. (The details are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but for an edited volume discussing current challenges and 
possibilities of functional neuroimaging, see Hanson & Bunzl, 2010.) In contrast 
to these complications, results from experiments such as Study III are relatively 
straightforward to interpret.  
This discussion is not intended to imply that functional neuroimaging 
techniques are not useful for understanding brain function⎯clearly they are. 
However, it is important to note that the evidence from neuroimaging is 
correlative in nature, and that the logic of drawing inferences is relatively 
indirect and complex by necessity as compared to patient studies aiming to 
localize function.  
4.1.4. Limitations of the single-patient approach 
One of the main disadvantages of single-patient studies is related to the unique 
pattern of deficits these studies investigate. Obviously, questions of interest can 
only be asked if a suitable patient is found. This difficulty is certainly easy to 
appreciate from the perspective of Study III: it would be incredibly difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to find another musically proficient patient with virtually 
no remaining hippocampal tissue and whose musical performance and sight-
reading skills have been spared to the same extent as in LSJ. 
A second, partly related disadvantage is that replicating a study with another 
patient can be impossible in the same sense as with intact human participants. 
The requirement that results can be replicated is central to all empirical science; 
however, in patient studies it is possible that an identical case of brain damage 
may never be reported. This is clearly an important limitation of the approach. 
What partially alleviates this is that all results can be replicated in other 
experiments with the same patient (Caramazza, 1986; Coltheart, 2001; 
McCloskey, 1993). The same patient is typically tested extensively with a wide 
range of stimuli and in multiple tasks. In Study I, patient BC’s spatial 
orientation processing was tested in four different experiments, and the 
interpretation of results was based on systematic patterns that were identified 
across tasks. 
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An additional remedy to the problem of replicability is the possibility of 
converging evidence from other studies. If the universality assumption is 
correct, and if the results from the studied patient are reliable, converging 
evidence from other studies should be able to corroborate the findings 
(Caramazza, 1992). Importantly for Study I, the proposal that orientation 
representations are compositional did receive corroborating evidence from 
studies with other patients (Study II, McCloskey, 2009) and normal participants 
(Gregory & McCloskey, 2010; Gregory et al., 2011). 
A third potential disadvantage of single-patient studies is the possibility that 
the cognitive mechanisms presumed to be universal could function in a 
qualitatively different way in some people within the general population 
(McCloskey, 1993). Conceivably, in this hypothetical scenario, investigating the 
cognitive performance of a brain-damaged patient with a premorbidly aberrant 
cognitive architecture could lead to misleading conclusions that cannot be 
generalized to be true of the general population. This is a potential concern, and 
it cannot be completely eliminated. In practice, however, several considerations 
alleviate this concern.  
First, one can, for example, be careful about only selecting patients with no 
evidence of a history of cognitive developmental deficits. Second, as noted 
previously, one should always expect to find converging evidence for reliable 
results from other studies. In Study I, the possibility cannot be ruled out with 
absolute certainty that the pattern of orientation errors in BC’s performance 
could have resulted from a premorbidly abnormal organization of cognitive 
function. However, similar patterns of performance identified in other patient 
studies (Study II, McCloskey, 2009) suggest that this concern is probably not 
very significant in practice. In contrast, one should always be careful about 
drawing strong conclusions from an isolated study unsupported by any other 
empirical data, regardless of method. 
A third factor mitigating the concern about qualitatively atypical individuals 
is the logical fact that if such aberrant cases exist but are rare in the whole 
population, then the probability of sampling one as an experimental subject 
among all brain-damaged individuals should also be small. In contrast, if the 
individual variation among the healthy population were extensive, this would 
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constitute a major methodological problem not only for single-patient studies 
but for virtually all studies of cognition. Extensive individual variation would 
lead to serious issues in the logic of nearly all experimental research in cognitive 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including experiments conducted with 
intact participants (McCloskey & Caramazza, 1988; McCloskey, 1993; Rapp, 
2011). Extensive heterogeneity in the healthy population would call into 
question the logic of reducing noise by aggregating data across groups of 
participants (in the form of group averages, for example) in samples from the 
healthy population, as the results could not be generalized to be true of the 
population. 
4.2. Converging evidence from neuroimaging and studies of 
brain damage 
Because of their relative advantages and limitations, functional neuroimaging 
methods and studies of brain-damaged patients are widely seen as 
complementary. For this reason, several authors have spoken for the 
importance of complementing neuroimaging findings with evidence from 
patient studies (Chatterjee, 2005; Cooper & Peebles, 2015; D'Esposito, 2010; 
Rorden & Karnath, 2004). 
In practice, however, neuroimaging studies are currently far more frequently 
conducted than patient studies, particularly in basic research. In a systematic 
review of the literature, Fellows et al. (2005) found that functional 
neuroimaging studies were not only overwhelmingly more popular in number of 
publications as compared to studies of brain-damaged patients, but they were 
also cited three times more often and published much more frequently in high-
impact journals, despite the weaker and less direct nature of the inferences that 
can be drawn from the data. Fellows et al. (2005) suggest that the novelty of the 
method and the allure of “seeing into” the normally functioning brain, rather 
than careful considerations about drawing inferences, are driving the 
prominence of functional neuroimaging. Chatterjee (2005) argues that the 
predominance of functional neuroimaging at the expense of patient studies may 
stem from practical and sociological factors, as opposed to scientific 
considerations: for example, it is often easier to find access to an fMRI scanner 
than to suitable patients.  
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As one potential solution to the imbalance between studies of brain-damaged 
patients and neuroimaging, some authors have argued that academic journals 
and funding agencies should prioritize research using multiple methods 
(D'Esposito, 2010). Perhaps a first, slightly more easily attainable step in this 
direction might be an attempt by different researchers to become more aware of 
the work of their peers using different methodologies. Citation patterns show 
that there is much room for improvement in this regard. In Fellows et al.’s 
(2005) study, the authors of both patient and neuroimaging studies were 
disproportionately likely to cite work that used the same methodology, and the 
bias was especially prominent in neuroimaging. According to Fellows et al. 
(2005, p. 854), this within-method bias shows that “there is no ongoing, 
intensive use of converging methods, at least as indexed by citation patterns”, 
despite repeated arguments from several prominent authors advocating the use 
of complementary methods.  
A similar concern has been voiced about the relation between studies 
conducted with healthy participants in cognitive psychology and studies of 
cognitive processing conducted with individuals with cognitive impairments: 
McCloskey (2001) argues that many opportunities and relevant evidence is 
missed because studies of impaired and normal cognitive performance are 
typically published in different journals and presented in different conferences, 
although the aims and theoretical questions are the same.  
As a relevant example related to this thesis, a substantial body of literature 
exists attributing the disruption that irrelevant sounds cause for memory 
performance to short-term memory processes (see Study IV). However, as noted 
previously, serial recall tasks arguably recruit both short- and long-term-
memory encoding mechanisms in intact participants. These processes are 
conflated in typical ISE-paradigm studies with healthy participants, such as 
Study IV. It seems clear that disentangling these processes could have 
potentially significant implications for the competing accounts. So far, the 
irrelevant sound effect has drawn the interest of researchers working with 
normal participants only. Again, converging evidence from patient studies 
might be particularly helpful for elucidating these issues. 
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At the same time, however, methodological advances in cognitive 
neuroscience may make across-method approaches increasingly challenging. 
Many recent innovations in methodology promise improved precision and 
sophisticated solutions to previous limitations of fMRI signal processing, and 
some of these can also be applied to EEG and MEG (e.g., Haxby, Connolly, & 
Guntupalli, 2014; Lewis-Peacock & Norman, 2014). While these methodological 
advances hold much promise, it may be increasingly challenging to prevent 
further segregation of the field as different methods become technically 
increasingly complicated. 
4.3. Levels of analysis and evidence from MEG 
In addition to single-patient studies of cognitive deficits, this dissertation also 
utilized MEG. In terms of different methodological approaches in informing 
theories at different levels of analysis, Study IV demonstrates a potential role for 
magnetic measurements at a level that seems distinct from purely cognitive 
theories or strict localization of function. However, their usefulness depends 
importantly on the researcher’s ability to decompose the psychological tasks 
used and on how well the brain responses in question are understood. 
4.3.1. Goals of brain measures and Study IV 
Coltheart (2010b) has proposed functional neuroimaging to have three possible 
goals: (1) to localize cognitive processes neuroanatomically; (2) to inform 
theories of cognition at the psychological level; or (3) to test purely neural 
models. By extension, these levels can also be applied to studies using MEG and 
EEG. 
However, a consideration of Study IV suggests that this classification may be 
somewhat restrictive. In Study IV, a modulation of responses generated in 
auditory cortex was seen as a function of memory load and task phase. The N1m 
responses for irrelevant tones were the strongest when memory load was the 
highest. The manipulation of memory load in this study is an example of what 
can be referred to as a parametric variation design (e.g., Wager & Lindquist, 
2011), in which a brain measure is used to investigate whether brain activity in a 
given region changes as the involvement of a cognitive process is incrementally 
varied. Although the obtained evidence is correlative in nature, the design can 
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provide more convincing evidence for inferences than experiments that fail to 
show a relation between different levels of the psychological variable and the 
brain measure(s). 
In Study IV, the results are informative of how neurons in a sensory cortical 
area respond in a particular context during a specific cognitive activity. 
However, what is potentially interesting about the finding is not where the 
processing of auditory stimuli took place (Coltheart’s goal 1). While the role of 
functional neuroimaging and other brain measures is sometimes equated with 
neuroanatomical localization of function (Coltheart, 2010b; Tressoldi, Sella, 
Coltheart, & Umiltà, 2012), it is not clear that this is the best description of 
studies such as Study IV, because the aim was not to investigate where 
irrelevant sounds are processed during a serial memory task but rather, how. 
The study arguably did not aim to localize cognitive functions, but the results 
are also not directly informative at the level of cognitive functions (goal 2) 
either, as it is not at all clear what the results mean for the relevant cognitive 
theories (partly because we currently do not understand the underlying 
cognitive processes fully, see Study IV). However, it would also seem incorrect 
to say that the results are only relevant for purely neural models (goal 3), as the 
point was to investigate neural responses in a very particular context related to 
memory acquisition. Thus, Coltheart’s (2010b) categorization may be missing 
something important about the practical aims of at least some studies using 
functional neuroimaging and/or electromagnetic tools. 
According to Bechtel and Richardson (2010), the point of identifying brain 
structures with cognitive functions should be understood more widely than 
simply finding out where given processes are instantiated. Bechtel and 
Richardson (2010) argue that the process of inquiry in cognitive neuroscience 
progresses through stages of reiteration involving different levels of analysis. 
According to Bechtel and Richardson (2010), functional neuroimaging (and by 
extension, other brain measures) can be useful for understanding how the brain 
enables the mind even if they currently cannot be used to test precise 
predictions about cognitive theories or their instantiation in the brain. Study IV 
can be seen as one example of what this can mean in practice. Although we are 
far from fully understanding why increased memory load should enhance 
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responses for unrelated sounds in auditory cortex during memory acquisition, 
the results seem like a potentially interesting piece in a larger puzzle. Future 
research will hopefully be able to shed more light on the precise nature of this 
interaction and where it will fit in a more complete picture of memory 
acquisition and auditory processing. 
As Marr (1982) noted, the algorithmic/representational and 
implementational levels are not completely independent of each other, and a 
complete understanding of how the brain enables the mind also requires an 
account of how the levels relate to each other. Conceivably, in a reiterative 
process such as the one described by Bechtel and Richardson (2010), advances 
at any level of analysis could potentially aid progress on the others. There is 
another side to the same coin, however: in the investigation of the relation 
between psychological phenomena and neural processes, the interpretation of 
experimental data depends on our knowledge of both sides of the relation. That 
is, the implications of the findings such as those from Study IV can only be 
interpreted in relation to what is known about the cognitive processes recruited 
by the behavioral task(s) used, about the patterns of responding in the relevant 
sensory cortical areas in other contexts, about the neural processes underlying 
the measured brain responses, and so on. As our knowledge of all these areas is 
incomplete, any and all of our conclusions can be subject to future revision.  
For example, many aspects regarding the N1m wave and the neural processes 
it reflects are well understood, but not all. The N1m has been shown to be 
generated within the Sylvian fissure in the auditory cortices and to reflect 
physical stimulus properties (Näätänen & Picton, 1987; Näätänen, 1992; Pantev 
et al., 1990; Papanicolaou et al., 1990). Evidence shows its latency to be 
extremely closely tied to the detection of auditory stimuli in terms of behavioral 
reaction times (Mäkinen, May, & Tiitinen, 2004). However, the exact details 
about the relation of the neural processes underlying the N1m wave and those 
related to cortical dynamics of auditory perception more generally are not 
entirely clear. For example, while one view holds that the N1m reflects stimulus 
detection and feature analysis on a very basic level without involving memory or 
other higher-order processing (e.g., Näätänen et al., 2005), another view 
suggests that the N1m is a holistic reflection of the functioning of auditory 
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cortex, including memory, perceptual learning, and top-down influences (May & 
Tiitinen, 2010).  
To quote Kappenman and Luck (2012, p. 16): “It is more difficult than one 
might think to demonstrate that a given ERP component (or any other 
physiological measure) reflects a specific neural or psychological process. The 
challenge arises from the fact that we are looking for a neural measure of a given 
process because we do not fully understand the process and wish to use the 
neural measure to study the process. Because we do not fully understand the 
process, it is difficult to design unambiguous tests of the hypothesis that a given 
component reflects this process.”  
Electromagnetic recordings of brain activity are and will continue to be 
important in the investigation of how the brain enables the mind. However, the 
point of this discussion is that inferences from all data in cognitive neuroscience 
have to be made relying both on the strength of each individual piece of 
evidence and the amount of converging evidence altogether⎯even in the case of 
event-related EEG and MEG responses, arguably the most direct non-invasively 
measurable indexes of human brain activity. 
4.3.2. Advantages of MEG  
One of the relative advantages of electrophysiological methods, especially MEG, 
can be seen in Study IV. In the context of the study, the processes of interest 
regarding individual stimulus items occurred in the range of hundreds of 
milliseconds. Within a period of seconds, several visual and auditory stimuli 
were presented, and in the low-load condition, the whole encoding phase was 
over in four seconds. Investigating how auditory stimuli are cortically processed 
would be fairly difficult in this context using hemodynamic tools with a 
temporal resolution in the range of seconds, such as PET of fMRI. In contrast, 
MEG was well suited for the task. Despite other temporally overlapping sensory 
processes (i.e., those related to the processing of visual stimuli), it was possible 
to pinpoint the modulation that occurred in auditory processing with MEG 
because the event-related fields could be recorded without systematic overlap 
with the visual stimuli, and the encoding and retention phases could be sharply 
delineated in the categorization of the recorded ERF’s. Future studies 
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investigating brain function in multimodal settings might benefit from a more 
frequent use of electromagnetic methods in combination to hemodynamic tools.  
As a final MEG-related note, recent methodological advances may now also 
provide a means for sharpening the spatial resolution of MEG through the use 
of multivariate analysis methods (Cichy et al., 2015). This has already been seen 
as having a potentially important impact on the field (Stokes et al., 2015), and 
may hold much promise for future studies. 
4.4. Further methodological observations 
Finally, the studies in this dissertation motivate two further notes regarding 
methodological issues. First, the questions relating to universality and potential 
heterogeneity within the healthy population would seem to warrant further 
discussion in future work. Second, the studies in this dissertation provide 
several reminders of the importance of a careful, critical analysis of the 
cognitive processes recruited in a given task.  
4.4.1. Universality, individual variability and cognitive neuroscience 
The prevailing approach is to assume that both the human cognitive 
architecture and the organization of brain function are fundamentally universal 
(Caramazza, 1986; 1992; Caramazza & Coltheart, 2006; McCloskey & 
Caramazza, 1988). However, it is not clear how individual functional and 
anatomic variability should be taken into consideration. The extent and nature 
of individual variation in cognitive mechanisms is understood relatively poorly, 
as surprisingly little work has been dedicated to it. There is a potential concern 
that the range of individual variation could be such that it would affect a 
researcher’s ability to discriminate between relevant scientific hypotheses 
(Rapp, 2011). For this reason, some authors go as far as explicitly rejecting the 
universality assumption (Bub, 2011). However, it is not clear what the 
implications of this solution are in practice, as currently nearly all experimental 
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience relies on it, even if the 
assumption is seldom explicated.  
According to Rapp (2011), an understanding of individual variation is critical 
for all disciplines concerned with cognition, but before an understanding is 
achieved of what the nature and extent of this variability might be, attractive 
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alternatives to the universality assumption may be hard to find. For example, in 
explaining patterns of performance in brain-damaged patients, it is problematic 
to invoke notions of premorbid variability without a clear understanding of the 
nature of this variation independent of the experimental data. Without such 
independent understanding, individual differences between patients prior to 
brain damage cannot be distinguished from the variability resulting from the 
damage itself. 
While the nature and extent of individual variance are currently not 
understood at the level of cognitive processing, individual brains are also 
anatomically different. Such differences might constitute additional problems 
especially for studies aiming to localize cognitive functions in the brain. 
Empirical reviews of functional neuroimaging studies of cognition find both 
consistencies and variability both at the individual and group levels (Cabeza & 
Nyberg, 2000). Some authors have argued that variability among neurologically 
intact experimental subjects may be one of the main causes for why many fMRI 
studies have failed to replicate reliably (Poline et al., 2010). Others seem to have 
at least some fundamental reservations about the universality assumption with 
respect to how cognitive processes are instantiated in the brain (Humphreys & 
Price, 2001). Others have explicitly argued that individual variability constitutes 
a major challenge for cognitive neuroscience in general (Uttal, 2013) and even 
suggested that the possibilities of localizing cognitive functions reliably with 
neuroimaging tools are limited because of such issues (Brett, Johnsrude, & 
Owen, 2002).  
Although these potential problems are generally acknowledged (Rapp, 2011; 
Rorden & Karnath, 2004) and some methods exist for taking differences into 
account in functional neuroimaging (Poline et al., 2010; Wager & Lindquist, 
2011), no consensus exists on what the extent of the problem or the best 
solutions might be. The nature and extent of individual variation therefore 
seems to warrant more detailed work. A thorough theoretical discussion of 
individual functional and neuroanatomical variability in light of the universality 
assumption and different methods in cognitive neuroscience would be useful for 
clarifying these issues. 
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4.4.2. Task analysis and cognitive processes 
As a final note, it should be kept in mind that a crucial component of all studies 
of brain and behavior is a careful analysis of the cognitive functions that given 
behavioral tasks recruit. That this is a critical step is both self-evident and easy 
to overlook in practice.  
In this dissertation, a key step towards a better understanding of orientation 
representations was the realization that the use of symmetrical, non-obliquely 
oriented stimuli conflated several potential forms of reflection error. This called 
previous interpretations of these empirical phenomena into question. The 
stimulus materials used in many previous studies, including those used in Study 
I, were inadequate for disentangling the underlying cognitive processes (see 
Study II).  
A second example of the importance of careful task analysis comes from the 
context of Study III: an important aspect of the motivation for the study was the 
observation that some of the experimental evidence from Milner and colleagues’ 
(Corkin, 1968; 2002; Milner, 1962) seminal studies with patient HM had 
probably not been interpreted correctly (Stanley & Krakauer, 2013). As Stanley 
and Krakauer (2013) contend, the evidence from tasks such as mirror drawing 
with HM, as immensely important as it has been for cognitive neuroscience, 
does not apply to complex motor skill but only one component of motor skill, 
unlike most authors have previously assumed (see Study III).  
As a third example, the interpretation of the data from Study IV depends 
crucially on our knowledge of the cognitive processes involved. As noted before, 
parametric designs, such as the one used in Study IV, can often provide more 
compelling evidence of brain-behavior correlations than mere activation 
differences between two conditions. However, as in any experiments 
investigating the neural basis of cognitive processes, the usefulness of the data 
hinges on our ability to decompose the psychological task to understand which 
cognitive processes are parametrically manipulated and how (Poldrack, 2010). 
This is far from a trivial task, and in practice often limits the usefulness of 
collected data in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Coltheart, 2010b; Cooper & 
Peebles, 2015; Kappenman & Luck, 2012; Love, 2015; Peebles & Cooper, 2015; 
Poldrack, 2010; 2012).  
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The best of methods can only provide us with answers as sophisticated as our 
questions. Making use of the best cognitive models available and selecting the 
behavioral tasks as carefully as possible is therefore critical, regardless of which 
methods are used. 
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